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H – 805

International Court of Justice

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I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the Tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the Tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

Je certifie qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministére Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 Avril 1946.

Ich bestaetige, dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokumente vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

[signature]

Signature of Counsel

Signature de l'Avocat

Unterschrift des Verteidigers.

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SPEER document
No. 44 Spe.

SPEER Exhibit No. .....

Dr. Walter SCHIEBER

7 May 1944

Confidential - Personal.

Reich Minister SPEER

The position of labor commitment steadily becoming more difficult is now bearing an intolerable burden on account of the withdrawal of the most experienced personnel from processing branches, the finished products of which are absorbed by the general armaments.

By an agreement between the Reich Minister of Justice and the General Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitments (Gb. Arb VIa 5131/32 v. 11.2.44) the further employment of the long-term prisoners after their release from gaol for service duties in the plants as heretofore was satisfactorily settled. Probably by virtue of a previous agreement between the Reich Fuehrer SS and Minister THIERACK this regulation is more and more violated by the fact that the prisoners having served out their sentences are transferred for working purposes to the SS plants. In particular the so-called antisocial elements, but also other types of convicts who, after long years of employment in war economy have been trained to become specialists and skilled workers, are thus lost to the war economy plants. With the steadily increasing lack of labor, their withdrawal means considerable inconvenience, and unpairs the processing of important war material.

In this connection, as already mentioned at Meran, I am compelled to make for once a complete report on a still greater disturbance of the work in our plants and a very serious endangering of production.

Out of the high percentage of foreign and particularly Russian workers engaged in our war industries, a number which is now no longer negligible is shifting gradually into the SS plants and thus lost to us. You know that

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we are content with the Russian workers and particularly the women - when they are treated reasonably. Many of them who, for comprehensible reasons, have a fondness for change, are now, for some petty offense or other, assigned by the police organizations to the SS plants and never return to their old places of work. This withdrawal is actuated by the ever increasing development of the large SS economic concerns, which development is being consistently pursued, especially by Obergruppenfuehrer POHL. To the numerous plants for civilian production, are added well-known, as well as secret, armament and general equipment plants.

As a result of the technical and economic success of the large wood manufacturing concerns at Dachau, the SS Reichfuehrer has determined to associate himself on a large scale in the economic direction of these industries and to set up plants in ever increasing numbers as a financial basis of the most varied tasks of the SS. In this respect, the hostile attitude of the SS against the notion of the autonomy of economic concerns plays a not unimportant part. This expansion is essentially facilitated by practically unlimited disposal of the labor forces - including the best skilled labor - within the concentration camps. You initial hesitation, derived from the reluctance to place a determined proportion of the armament production at the disposal of the SS, accelerated this development. As an example, I only mention here the conversion of the large SS brickyard of Oranienburg, the processing works in the Oranienburg camp, the association of the SS in the "Elektrotechnik" at Getewend, the pistol factory at Karlsruhe, the armament manufacture in Buchenwald, Mauthausen and Neuengamme; the hitherto unsuccessful attempt at production of chemical products (N-products etc.), the motor vehicle works installation in the Protectorate etc. Thanks to your agreement of last autumn and winter with the Reichsfuehrer, by which the quota of equipment and armament production to be directly allotted to the SS be proportionate with the number of work-hours performed by the Labor Units provided by the SS camps of the Waffen-SS and police, the development mentioned above has fortunately been hampered and almost discontinued. True we had, for that, to be responsible for the institution in our armament factories of the KZ-subdivions, a source of much friction, but the material and human success outweighs by far the drawbacks which lie essentially in jealousy among

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The present SS tendency not only annuls the initial success but, more than that, much foreign labor is being withdrawn from us because the number of concentration camp inmates is to be increased, so that, in cases of small as well as more serious offenses of foreign workers, these will be transferred from the foreign labor camps into concentration camps. In addition, there is the SS demand to draft a great many Jewish, especially female Jewish workers who, I dare say, liked to work and worked with particular diligence in the small parts industry and here in the electro technical industry. Thanks to the food that our works managers always again manage to provide, difficulties notwithstanding, and thanks to the generally descent and humane treatment given also foreign labor and workers from concentration camps, the Jewesses as well as concentration camp inmates are doing good work, and they do their best so as not to be sent back to the concentration camp. In view of these facts, we really should be given increased numbers of concentration camp inmates for the armaments industry, but should you not succeed in having the Reichfuehrer confirm the previous arrangement once again and specifically, this valuable class of workers will be nearly all lost by us to the SS establishments where control is not possible. In particular the deputies of Obergruppenfuehrer POHL and of Obergruppenfuehrer KAMMLER should be instructed do desist from their present attitude, and to discontinue the methods they apply. As an illustration, I refer to the promise from the Reichfuehrer SS that, in view of the exceedingly stringent situation in the production of electric tubes, I am permitted to employ 200 to 300 Jewesses in the plant located in the caves at Dresden where provision is made for adquate ventilation, heating, day light and a big communal kitchen. Nevertheless, these people were again withdrawn from me on orders from POHL - purportedly in line with instructions from Gauleiters SAUCKEL and MUTSCHMANN, and they were sent to an SS-concentration camp establishment. I must point to similar facts in other lines of production so that the number of concentration camp inmates employed in the armament industry decreases rather increases. Of the 100,000 workers once promised you for the small parts industry, we did not receive even 14,000. I do not know just how many are being employed by the technical offices and by offices concerned with raw materials, but the man-hours produced for our armament industry by concentration camp inmates does not amount to 8 million hours, so that certainly not more than about 32,000 men and women from concentration camps can be working in our armament establishments. This amount is constantly diminishing.

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I have gone into the details of the whole question with the deputy of SS Lieutenant General (Obergruppenfuehrer) POHL, Major (Sturmbannfuehrer) MAURER, and have especially alluded to the fact, that by a decentralised distribution of concentration camp labor, a technically suitable utilization of their labor would be possible by means of better feeding and reasonable lodging. To that MAURER objects that the SS will not have sufficient guards available for dispersal in many small working units, that we would not deliver sufficient barbed wire to fence in the factory camps and that the danger of secret sabotage in non-concentration camp factories cannot be underestimated, by reason of the lack of strict control and discipline. Furthermore MAURER emphasizes that SS Lieutenant Colonel POHL is continually improving the food situation of camp inmates working in concentration camp factories and that noticeable increase in weight and thereby greater working capacity have been attained by the giving of additional albumen under continuous medical supervision. It would be necessary, however, for us to place at their disposal old skilled specialist workers and foremen as leading personnel in the armament factories of the SS. I cannot check these statements of MAURER in detail. I have, however, explained to him unequivocally that the availability and the giving up of leading personnel as requested is out of the question, but only the contrary method of leaving the concentration camp inmates in the independent responsibility of the armament industry as provided for, unequivocably agreed upon and followed with some success.

Dear Herr SPEER, I know how little you esteem long writings and unofficial - especially "Confidential - Personnel" - statements. However the labor commitment situation in the armament industry, the peculiarity of the problems submitted and the negative attitude and bearing of our partner force me to explain to you the situation in detail and to ask for your intervention. Enclosed I am adding draft of two letters to the Reich Fuehrer SS, moreover I find it necessary for you to try in a verbal discussion to obtain a definite decision, which I would urgently request.

signed Walter SCHIEBER

For the correctness of the copy
Dr. FLAECHSNER
Attorney-at-law

SPEER Exhibit No .....

SPEER Document
No.45....Spe

Extract from the Fuehrer Conference

on 3 - 5 June 1944

Point 22: Pointed out to the Fuehrer that 30 - 40.000 workers or prisoners of war, who had run away from Economy as a whole, were recaptured by the police every month, and then used as concentration camp prisoners for the purposes of the SS.

I could not stand for this as the workers involved are to a large part either trained workers or specialists, who should be returned to their original profession as quickly as possible. I could not sustain a decrease of 500.000 workers a year and the distribution of those workers should therefore be carried out by me, or SAUCKEL. This applied all the more as the workers involved were to a large part specialists who had been painstakingly trained.

After a discussion with Party member HIMMLER, the Fuehrer will make in this case also a decision in my favor.

signed SPEER

Certified true extract:

Dr. FLAECHSNER

Attorney-at-Law.

H0805 – 0008

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SPEER Exhibit No .....

SPEER Document
No. 46 Spe

Reichsleiter M. BORMANN
to all Gauleiters:

Fuehrer Headquarters, 23 March 1945

DECREE

Subject: Reception of fellow nationals (Volksgenossen) etc. withdrawn from evacuated territories.

I communicate by order:

The Fuehrer issued 19 March 1945 an order concerning demolition measures, which has already been transmitted to you or which you receive enclosed.

At the same time the Fuehrer ordered the following in an equally unequivocal manner:

Territories which we cannot hold at present and the occupation of which by the enemy is to be foreseen, are to be evacuated. The Fuehrer makes it the duty of the Gauleiters of the forward Gaus to undertake everything humanly possible in order to secure the total evacuation, that means the complete transfer of all fellow nationals (Volksgenossen).

The Fuehrer is familiar with the tremendous difficulties involved in this order, which have been described to him many times.

The order of the Fuehrer is based on exact, sound considerations. The absolute necessity of the evacuation cannot even be discussed.

Equally difficult as the evacuation and transport, is the quartering of the fellow nationals (Volksgenossen) in the German receiving Gaue (districts), in the interior.

This apparently impossible sheltering of fellow nationals from the evacuated territories must be achieved, however.

The Fuehrer expects the German Gaue (districts) in the interior to show the necessary understanding for the inevitable demands of the hour.

We must use all the means of improvisation

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SPEER Document
No. 46 Spe
cont'd

in order to master the present situation in all fields.

Heil Hitler!

signed: M. BORMANN

Distribution

6 Kreisleiter (district leader) Dr.STURM

KLEWER "Oberregierungsrat (ORR)RUEHL

NEVEN HOERNER

BINDER DR. VOEGLER

Certified true copy

Dr. FLAECHSNER

Attorney-at-Law

H0805-0011

SPEER Exhibit No. .....

SPEER Document No. 47 Spe.

Speech of the Reich Minister SPEER on 9 June before representatives of the Rhine-Westphalian industry, following a presentation of the film regarding "Independent responsibility of Industry".

....." What does "Independent responsibility of the industry" mean ? What tasks are given to this organisation, the name of which has today unfortunately already become in many respects a slogan ?

Up to the year 1942 industry received its state orders - and such are mainly the ones in question during the war - from the official offices of the Reich, from the Army Ordnance Branches (Waffenaemter) of the branches of the Wehrmacht, etc.

The works manager offered his installations to the branches of the Wehrmacht and in so doing he determined the production of a plant himself, or in so far as he worked mainly for one branch of the Wehrmacht, this production was undertaken by the officers of that branch of the Wehrmacht and here mainly by the Technical Army Ordnance Branches (Technische Waffenaemter)

In this way the responsibility for the completion of armament, for the drawing up of the programs, for the measures of rationalization, and for the exchange of experiences, lay with the officers whose aspirations and professional ability were bound to lie in entirely different spheres.

The competitive struggle in the free economy, the responsibility which every works manager had to take upon himself for his planning/of production in peace time, the severe school of the battle for life so to say, which a leading industrial engineer usually had to undergo, this strict selection cannot be guaranteed at the present time in most branches of our administrative careers. .....

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.....If I had had 10 years time in which to prepare and to carry out an organization of the armament industry peacefully, I might have worked in other directions. But as it is the main thing for me at present is.

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to carry out the change of system within a few months: the change from the direction of armament production and the determination of its output as a whole and in detail by the state authorities, which has been the case up to now, to the taking over of this task by a circle of successful leading men of the armament industry itself who have had works experience.

I did not hesitate long in the spring of 1942, and so one demand of the Fuehrer after the other could be accepted by us for execution and could be established as program. --- Programs, the realization of which had been made impossible of execution or dependent on impossible conditions by the authorities previously for them,conditions, for instance, such as the construction of factory installatio to the value of several billions of Marks within a few months, or the making available of a short-term production of all machine tool factories within a short period --- or the additional concentration of German specialists who would not have been available to this extent --- or finally the making available of metals in short supply which would never have been at the disposal of German armament.

But we nevertheless took over these programs at that time and agreed to their execution, because we believed that there still are considerable unexhausted reserves in our plants, reserves which, however, could be increased only if new methods of production increase and the execution of the programs could be accomplished in these plants in a revolutionary way, without red tape.".....

....." I therefore decided at that time to entrust the best leading engineers a my disposal from the whole industry and all those workers who had so far already distingnished themselves by their performances in their plants, with the entire responsibility for the time being for the production of tanks, weapons, and munitions.....

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.....Today, we count 21 main commissions which are responsible for the final armament production, and 12 syndicates which must to guarantee the deliveries necessary to it, by which the whole of the most important armament and war production is directed.

In addition to the main Commissions and Syndicates individual advisory bodies have been formed where construction engineers of the firms and representatives the branches of the Wehrmacht whose requirements are involved - sit together all having equal rights. As a rule these "commissions" are headed by the chief construction engineers of the industry. Into their hands is placed the final decision on the development of weapons.

Their decisions can be cancelled only by the High Command of the branches of the Wehrmacht and myself, jointly, or, in the last analysis, by the Fuehrer himself.

This unique organization which possesses in itself all responsibility, consists today of about 6 thousand honorary technicians and engineers whom industry has made available...

.....On these honorary members of industry devolves the responsibility even down to details of what is being done in the individual works and how it is being done, which enables them to give all instructions necessary to carry through their point of view and to furnish to the management of the plants whatever information they may need. The Reichministry for Armament and war Production, of which the most important armament organization are the Main Commissions and Syndicates, has, in its further composition, merely become a reflection of the independent responsibility of industry. Almost all government offices are staffed with men from industry whose colleagues in most instances and for the duration of the emergency, were made available to us by industry.....

.....Technical direction down to the smallest branches of industrial manufacture is carried out through industrial independent responsibility. Next to that of supplying the plants with orders its main tasks, are that of type restriction, specialisation of the plants and, among other things, the shutting down of entire production, and of the plants, rationalization as regards raw materials, construction, technical aspect of the finished product and the unconditional exchange of experience, irrespective of protective rights.....

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....Every establishment, after it has been in existence a certain length of time and when it exceeds a certain size develops a tendency to work according to burocratic principles. Though we were fortunate enough to see, through one of the first big air attacks on Berlin a great portion of files of the Ministry destroyed - thus freeing us for some time from unnecessary ballast, we should not expect that such happenings will permanently bring the necessary fresh atmosphere into our work. It is fitting that I remind you here of my order of 10 August 1942 issued to the main Commissions and Syndicates, an order which is fully effective also today.

It says: Within the framework of the highest degree of independent industrial responsibility, I have granted you extraordinary powers and I have made possible for you a largescale method of work. It is becoming evident that there one an increasing number of individual cases where Commissions and Syndicates show the very first indications of a tendency towards burocratic principles in their work. On that subject one thing can be said: In the armaments field there are any number of government offices which, once they had developed into a well organized body, would be able to produce satisfactory work and make satisfactory decisions. All these government establishments lack only one essential thing: the ability for improvization, which is given only to him who is possession of the necessary technical knowledge - without his being cramped by governmental apparatus.

The more the heads of Commissions and Syndicates develops the them into extensive undertakings, the more difficult they will make the possibility of applying their active forces, the product of industry itself, in fruitful activity for the benefit of armament tasks;

It becomes evident already today that the results abtained by the heads of Commissions and Syndicates whose organizations are small, rank higher than thos of the ones who vainly endeavor to handly administratively what their work calls for.

When it comes to their decisive tasks, they should depend more on the cooperation of a circle of enthusiastic comrades who follow the call joyfully. For the carrying out of their work, the Commission and Syndicates can freely call on Army Ordnance Branches, munitions inspection offices and economie groups as well as the regional economic offices.

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If you make proper use of these authorities, you will be able to save yourself and the undertakings in your hands much of the burden of labor.

I am determined to counter without consideration all attempts to turn the Commissions and Syndicates into an authority with all its disadvantages."

I ask all those collaborators from industry, who are assisting me in my chief Commissions and Syndicates to continue to keep my basic principle before their eyes a... to comply with it. .....

..... My commissioners for the individual production groups will each be selected from the enterprise in which we can recognize the best output. It is your duty to share fully with the other enterprises of your production group the experiences which you have gained in your plant and which have led to success there, either voluntarily or by compulsion. It is furthermore your task to bring about the lead which your plant has gained, in all other enterprises of this kind. You thereby retain the lead in your plant which was gained by the work of years.

We have numerous instances in which the technical leadership of a plant with an express monopoly production, established the same production for other enterprises and at the beginning discharged primary skilled workers - which if, measured according to old private-industrial basic principles, was to establish enterprises in the position to compete strongly with former monopoly-enterprises after the war.

We have found factory-leaders and technicians, who established new factories for the purpose of carrying out the task assigned to them by me, and thereby - with the fanaticism of the technicians to procure the best - utilized all experiences in the new plant, which they had gained in their old plant, but were no longer able to exploit.

It is understandable that difficulties were made here to my commissioners by the men responsible for the business part of the plant; difficulties,

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which for the most part do not come to my knowledge, and which cannot be determined and pursued without further investigation. .....

..... My chief Commissions and Syndicates and the production-committees in the economic- and specialist-groups are agencies; which, in addition to their authority to issue directives, support and assist the factory-leader. A condensation of planning and a central control of the armament program are an indispensable necessity for all production down to the single parts and the sub-divisions.

However, we wish to keep the goal in sight, and we only wish to render the controlling armament agencies effective inasfar as this is urgently necessary, and for the rest, to leave greater scope for the independent the factory-leader as an important part of in dependent reponsibility of responsibility of/industry. In this way I see in the chief Commissions and syndicates only a part of the independent responsibility of industry; an additional directive agency, which besides its controlling tasks is necessary in order to direct the inferior plants to a better achievement.

.....

..... All of us, who have volunteered in these years which will decide the fate of the nation to procure the utmost from German production consider this task as purely conditioned by war.

We are all looking forward with pleasure to the day of peace, on which we will again be able to turn to our old tasks....."

Certified True Excerpt:

s/ Dr. FLAECHSNER

Attorney-at-law

SPEER Exhibit No. . . . . .

SPEER Document

No. 48 Spe.

Excerpt from the Fuehrer Protocol of August 18/20, 1944.

Point 8: "The Fuehrer agrees to the instructions we propose for paralyzing instead of destroying industrial or power plants falling temporarily into enemy hands."

For the correctness of the exerpt

Dr. FLAECHSNER

Attorney-at-Law.

H0805 - 0019

H0805-0020

SPEER Document
No. 49 Spe

SPEER Exhibit No. . . . . .

Excerpt from the memorandum to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General GUDERIAN, of December 15th, 1944.

..... The invasion in the West has occasioned a profound change in the bas of German economical life. ..... It must be emphasized that the continual enemy influence on the traffic not have reduced the coal supply of the German economy to half the normal consumption. At this moment there is no possibility of utilizing fully the remaining coal mines, after the loss of the different coal-areas - now that of the Saar territory too - and of distributing the amount produced suitably. Extensive stand-stills are therefore to be expected, not only in the principal coal using basic industries (iron, chemistry, stones and clays, and in the power supply-industr (current and gas) but also in the final finishing process. The deficits which originated, cannot yet be counted in terms of figures. At any rate they alread mean a serious danger to the German armament potential in the near future, which can be avoided only by the continued effective defensive in the air war.

In this state of affairs, more losses will be unbearable for the war econo my, because they are limiting the armament potential to an extent excludi even an approximate cover of the requirements of the Wehrmacht in equipmen within a short time. In the Eastern territories, lost by the retreat of the front to the Nibelungen - Position, there are decisive stocks of basic materials, and a great manufacturing capacity, due to transfer from the West in connection with the air warfare, for which there is no further possibility of transfer.

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From the Western territories, considering the present situation, the coal consumption, especially that of the German Reich Railway can be covered only uncompletely, so that the German coal-supply must come principally from the works of Upper Silesia. The taking of the Nibelungen Position would mean that about 60 % of the present coal production of the Eastern territories would be lost. In this way the coal supply of German industry which can at present be covered by about 50 %, could be covered only partially.

In the sphere of iron production there is East of the Nibelungen-Position a crude steel production of 372.000 tons per month, and a production of 252.000 tons per month rolling-mill products. That is more than one-third of the crude steel production still possible. Considering the effects of the close proximity of the front on production situated in the area of the frontline, especially also in the politically insecure Protectorate, armament manufacture would fall during 1945 with the loss of this production by the exhausting of all possibility of economising, to about one-third the output according to the 1944 program. That diminishes the combat capacity of the troops.

....." To sum up it must be said, that the retreat to the Nibelungen-Position destroys the last basis for armament and war production which will suffice even the most limited needs of the Armed Forces as regards war material. It therefor implies the diminution of the combat capacity of the troops within a very short time.

Under these circumstances it would appear to me doubtful if it can be justifiable to use material and labor in the construction of these defenses. At any rate I cannot leave it in doubt, that in such an event I could not continue the ensuring in any manner of the armament supply of the Wehrmacht.

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For the correctness of the excerpt:

Dr. FLAECHSNER

Attorney-at-Law.

SPETR

Doc. No. 50 SPETR Exh. No. . . . .

Answered Interrogatory of the witness

Hans KEHRL

Question 1.) What office did you hold in the Speer Ministry? Professional or honorary duties?

Answer 1.) From September 16th 1943 I was head of the planning offices and besides from November 1st 1943 head of the raw material office in the Speer Ministry. Being an independant textils manufacturer I worked honorarily and only got a "Aufwandsentschaedigung" - as far as possible after the rules of the budget - a part of the actual cash-expenses incurred by myself and my firm on account of my honorary activities.

Question 2.) Did the individual sections of the war economy essential industries or agencies in need of manpower (Bedarfstraeger) place their deman for manpower immediately with the Plenipotentiary-General for the Mobilization of Labour and did Sauckel reserve for himself the extent of the allotments or did he leave this decision to Speer or the Planning Centres?

Answer 2.) During my work in the Speer Ministry the individual sections of the war economy essential industries or agencies in need of manpower (Bedarfstraeger) placed their demands for manpower directly with the Plenipotentiary-General for the Mobilization of Labour. Sauckel did reserve for himself the extent of the allotments. He did not agree to a right of decision either for the "Central Planning" or for Speer alone. After several negotiations he agreed to accept advice of the"Central Planning" about the economic priority of the different claims put in as interesting material, without agreeing to be forced to decide accordingly.

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As far as I can recollect only 2 conferences took place - at least one of them during the sickness of Speer in spring 1944 - confined in its extents by Sauckel's standpoint outlined above. After that attempts of influencing the manpower policies by general economic view-points were abandoned as practically futile.

Question 3.) Were the industries or agencies requiring manpower about the following in spring 1944: Army and Navy armament, air-armament, coal, mining, chemistry, railroads, mail, agriculutre, forestry, construction, administration of the ground forces, Air Force, Navy general administration? Can you supplement this list? What of these sections submitted their demands to the Speer Ministry?

Answer 3.) The agencies requiring manpower mentioned in the question correspond with my recollection. A further independant agency was the Ministry of Propaganda for the activity in overcoming civil air-raid damages. The following sections submitted their demands through the Speer-Ministry Army and Navy armament, mining (including coal), chemistry and all other production sections as well as energy and construction. The other agencies mentioned submitted their demands directly. It is not known to me what date the demand of air-armament were included in Speer's demands, as air-armaments was only taken over by the Speer Ministry in the course of summer 1944. It is not known to me, how far regional offices of the "Wehrmacht" and other regional offices put in demands with the regional employment offices directly.- As actual allotments were effectuated mainly regionally, I was under the impression that the so-called central allotments were frequently of theorectic importance only.

Question 4.) According to the 1929 Geneva convention concerning Prisoners of War, no work which the latter have to preform must have any direct connection with the actual carrying out of warlike operations. In particular it is forbidden to use prisoners of war for the manufacture of transportation of weapons or munitions of any kind, or for transporting materials destined for fighting troops.

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Are the concerns included in inspectorates of war establishments exclusively such establishments as produced objects that come under the above mentioned definitions.

Answer 4.) Factories included in inspectorates of armaments("Ruestungsinspektionen") are by no means exclusively, probably not even in their majority factories that correspond to the definitions mentioned in the question. I was not able to see any system whatsoever in the choice of the factories at the opening of the inspectorate-offices. Even at the beginning of this organization mills in the textile, leather, wood, glass and earthenware field as well as raw material and feeder-industries were included to a great extent in the list of firms under the inspectorates. The number of factories and the number of industrial sections increased from year to year.

Question 5.) Did the plants of the armament inspectorates include all plants producing "iron, steel and metal" and those manufacturing "machines, boilers, vehicles and appliances"? Did these plants comprise approximately all of the metal producing industry and were in Septembe 1943 also the raw-steel production and the feeder industries added s that the entire steel industry from raw-steel to the final product constitute an armament industry?

Answer 5.) It is not possible to answer this question without fail, as distinct central instructions as to which firms were to be included were missing and therefore the question was decided regionally i.e. differently. Apart from the industrial sections mentioned in answer 4 the factories enumerated in question 5 were in 1943/44 totally under the inspectorates with possible but not important exceptions.

Question 6.) What percentage of the steel production was used to produce objects of armament in the sense of the Geneva Regulations on Prisoners of War of 1929?

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Answer 6.) On an average allotment of iron of 2.500.000 tons monthly the allotment for the production of armaments in the sense of the Geneva Regulations on Prisoners of War of 1929 amounted to an average of 750.900.000 tons monthly i.e. to about 30 to 35%. Out of this allotment the final completion had to allot all production of parts and preliminary processing.

Question 7.) Approximately what percentage of working hours is used for the production of raw-steel and preliminary processing of an object of armament and what precentage for its final completion?

Answer 7.) Without records I am not able to answer this question reliably. The percentage ought to differ considerably with the different objects of armaments. Taking into consideration the number of men employed in the iron and metal producing and consuming industries I would estimate that about 60% of working hours were spent for the production of raw-material, preliminary processing manufacturing of parts and about 40% for the final completion taking an average of all armaments

Question 8.) As a rule, did the Speer Ministry stipulate in its demands for manpower only a figure or did it break the figure down according to nationalities or prisoners of war?

Answer 8.) To my knowledge the demands for manpower were presented as a rule by the Speer Ministry in one figure only. A breaking down of figures according to nationalities or Prisoners of War did not take place as far as I know. A breaking down would not have been possible because the possibilities of allotment were unknown to the Ministry. For the same reasons there was no breaking down in male and female labour as far as I know. There was only on exception: coal mining, for whic mainly Russian Prisoners of War were chosen after examination as to their fitness for mining.

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Question 9.) Did the intermediary agency have any influence as to the nationality of the manpower it was allotted or that was allotted to the plants, or were the prisoners of war allotted by the employment offices?

Answer 9.) I am not able to answer this question to my own knowledge. For the allotment as to number, sex, nationalities etc. the decision rested only with employment offices. I do not however not know whether the intermediary offices or the plants were able to influence their decision or have done so.

Question 9a) Were the reserves of German manpower used to capacity and what is your estimate of the reserves after the success of the Action for Total War in July/August 1944?

Answer 9a) To my mind reserves of male German manpower did not exist after the Action of July/August 1944. It is difficult to say to what extent theoretically fitted female labour were disposable after that date, as the physical and psychic (?) fitness was much diminished through continuous air-raids and lack of sleep caused by them. Apart from that the demand for manpower at that time was almost exclusively for work unfitted for women or fitted for especially strong women only.

Question 9b) Since when did the differences of opinion exist between Sauckel and Speer about the utilization of these reserves? What were the attemp made by Speer to employ these reserves?

H0805 – 0027

Answer 9b) Differences of opinion between Speer and Sauckel as to the mobilization of available German manpower came to my knowledge in summer 1943 for the first time, when Speer insisted upon their mobilization instead of taking in additional foreign labourers., Speer then urged vainly an action like the one that took place one year later on under the name of "Goebbels Action". It was impossible for Speer to mobilize these reserves himself as he did not possess the authority and jurisdiction to do so. Through shifting labour within his own section he tried to create working places for light labour for women, in order to be able to employ more German women. He shifted in large extant work from industrial branches strained as to manpower into industries producing for civil demands and not working to capacity yet, also into home-work and to occupied territories. He undertook the transfer of production for civil consumption and production of parts on a large scale to the occupied territories in order to set free German workmen for his own manpower demand.

Question 9c) What were the differences of opinion between Sauckel and Speer on the labour employment policy in the occupied territories and since when did they exist ?

Answer 9c) As to my knowledge the differences of opinion between Sauckel and Speer about the labour employment policy in the occupied territories emerged in summer 1943 beginning about July. Up to this date the demand for foreign workers could obviously be covered by Sauckel through voluntary recruitment without difficulties. When in summer 1943 the hiring did not cover the demand any more and did interfere with the production in the territories Speer proposed a transfering of production to the occupied territories, instead of a transfer of workmen to Germany. (See to answer 9b) Sauckel was of the opinion that both ought to be possible at the same time. The differences of opinion lasted till the end of 1943. When at the beginning of 1944 Adolf Hitler decided mainly in the sense of Sauckel, Speer, nevertheless, tried to reach his aim through the so-called "S" plants in the occupied territories, i.e. plants out of which workmen were not to be hired. On the direction of Speer as many plants as possible were declared as "S" plants ("Schutz-Betriebe").

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H0805-0029

Question 10) Did Speer support agriculture and the food industry at the expense of armaments since February 1945 and what measures in this respect do you remember ?

Answer 10) Beginning February 1945 Speer declared priority for nutrition and nu-trition-industry practically for all purposes, as far as central influence could still be exercised at that time, for instance priority in allotment of coal, electric current, in transportation and for an emergency program of agricultural implements and spareparts in the iron consuming industry. This same tendency was followed in numerous single decisions.

Question 11) Did you, by order of Speer issue a decree suspending the production of explosives for economic purposes? When did that occur and what was the intention?

Answer 11) The authority for the production of explosives came to the raw material office in the course of a reorganisation of the Ministry in November 1944 only. When beginning February 1945 intentions of extensive destructions in German territories to be evacuated could be recognized, Speer ordered me to diminish allotment of explosives for economic purposes i.e. mainly for mining to an extent that there remained low stocks only. As soon as extensive destructions were ordered, I stopped, at his request, further deliveries totally and interfered with current shipments as far as possible. The intention was recognised by the agencies executing these orders - without its being mentioned on account of the opposing orders- and therefore executed with special willingness.

H0805 - 0030

Question 12) Did Speer exert his influence to the effect that the metal-ore mines in the Balkans were not destroyed prior to the occupation, and why ?

Answer 12) Yes. Speer was of the opinion that the metal-ore mines would be of no advantage to the enemy, as his armament had no lack of metal, and that no one could take the responsibility for a destruction only in order to damage the economic system of a territory so far occupied.

Signed Hans KEHRL

Signature witnessed by:

Ralph A. Nitz.

1st Lt. Luf.

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Certified true copy

Signed: Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER

Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER

Attorney-at-Law

HO805-0031

SPEER Document No. 51
SPEER Exhibit No. .....

Excerpt from:

Testimony of witness SCHIEBER, taken on behalf of the Defendant SPEER, by Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER at Darmstadt, Germany, on 3 April 1946.

Cross-Examination: Mr. Charles S. Burdell, OUSCC.

Interpreter : Wolfgang THORMANN

Dr. FLAECHSNER to the witness: Do you solemnly swear that the statements you are about to make shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?

Witness: I do.

Question 1: What were your functions in the SPEER Ministry ?

Answer 1: According to the system of autonomous responsibility of the economy, built up by SPEER, with its sub-divisions into committees and rings for works of the same branch of production, the concentration of the whole supply industry in the armament delivery office of the Ministry had been assigned to me since spring 1943. In addition to that, I had as a deputy of the Minister, to keep up the permament contact of all offices and sections of the Ministry with the Plenipotentiary (Generalbeauftragter) for the armament production in Italy and to do the work resulting from this cooperation at the Berlin central office. In autumn 1944, I had to resign from my post as chief of the Armament delivery office on account of demands, made already months before by HITLER, BORMANN and several "Gauleiters - partly for personal reasons but especially for political reasons, in particular in the fight for the maintaining the autonomous responsibility of the economy.

Question 2: Did the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment divide up the war-economy into separate sections the so-called "Bedarfstraeger" (consumers) and did he reserve for himself to negotiate directly about the demands and allocations of labor to these consumers ?

Answer 2: Whereas, when the Plenipotentiary General for Commitment of Labor was put into office, which was done on SPEER's proposal, in the first place had demanded a submission to and then at least a close collaboration on the same level with SAUCKEL, the latter had stressed and secured in a forceful manner at the outset his complete independence with regard to all questions of labor Commitment. – Even decisions of the Headquarters for the Distribution of Labor (Zentrale Planung ueber Verteilung von Arbeitskraeften) he did not admit or recognize except as a recommandation. All essentia negotiations and decisions with the consumers concerning the needs and distribution of labor were reserved to himself, besides from time to time direct discussions of the agencies of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment with the separate groups in need of labor of the various consumers were demanded; e.g. the iron producing industry which belonged to my domain.

Question 9: What percentage of labor employed from the production of crude steel to the finished product – is used for the production of an article of armament, according to the terms of the Geneva Convention

Answer 9: In 1944, as far as I remember, the following numbers were employed.

on the production of small parts nearly	4 million	persons
on the production of civilian goods	about 21/2	" "
on the production of raw material	1,850,000	"
on the production of coal	1,100,000	"
whereas in armament industry	4,500,000	"

The armament industry, however, produced many implements and equipment, as for instance railroad rolling stock, motor vehicles which, according to the terms of the Geneva Convention are not war equipment. I can only estimate that perhaps 2,8 to 3 million persons or about 20% of the workers in the armament industry were employed on the production of purely war equipment.

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Question 10: Was the request for workers by the SPEER Ministry usually made as a total number or divided into German and foreign workers or prisoners of war and what would have been SAUCKEL's attitude towards such a classification ?

Answer 10: The Ministry requested the necessary workers mostly as a total number - divided into male and female or skilled workers. The demands of German skilled workers and for the increased employment of German women could not be met by the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment, who reserved the right of allotting and frequently did not even recognize the classification, as ordered, into male and female.

Question 11: How and by whom, on the intermediate level, was the distribution amongst the factories of the available workers according to specialized skill and nationality done and the assigning of the prisoners of war determined ?

Answer 11: The assigning and distribution on the intermediate level was one of the rights of the provincial or Gau employment offices respectively, which has been strictly preserved. It was only through the introduction of the so-called Red Slips (Rotzettel), issued in the central office, to which the employment offices had to give preference, that a certain consideration for the requirements as fixed by the Ministry was guaranteed; this did not, however, give the offices of the SPEER Ministry the right to exercise any great influence on making the assignments according to specialized skill or nationality.

Question 12: Who fought against the "independent responsibility of industry" established by SPEER, and on what grounds ?

H0805-0033

H0805-0034

Answer 12: The majority of the "Gauleiters", - not all of them - several Wehrkreis commissioners and some leaders of the SS, who had authority for making decisions on economic matters, were against the independent responsibility of economy and that largely for Gau-egotistical reasons, or, in the case of the SS, for economic political reasons. The factory managers tried and succeeded in escaping too strong party political pressure in the Gaus by being backed up by the "party free" Minister SPEER.

Question 13: What economic aspirations were pursued by HIMMLER and the SS and how did HIMMLER try - through the concentration camps - to obtain the control of armament factories ?

Answer 13: After the SS had gained considerable economic and technical success in their large wood processing industries in Dachau, HIMMLER and POHL decided to take part in the direction of industry themselves and to gain control of more and more plants as a financial basis for the very varied tasks of the SS. This expansion was already [illegible] backed by the availability of the many workers from the concentration camps, among whom were, above all, many excellent skilled workers. Furthermore since SPEER for a long time refused to give a decisive predominance of the arms production at the direct disposal of the SS, HIMMLER proceeded to build or bring under his control those armament factories, by providing and working them exclusively with workers from concentration camps.

Question 14: Was SPEER and his Ministry for or against these aspirations and why ?

H0805-0035

Answer 14: SPEER and the majority of his close assistants were unequivocally against these aspirations, because in the first place it was unbearable that the SS troops were provided with other or better arms, because furthermore a foolish scattering of energy, equipment etc. would be the result of an unavoidable duplication of work but above all, because the SS plants evaded and objected every reasonable and necessary control of material to be used, production figures exchange of experience etc. through the Armament Ministry.

Question 15: Do you know whether HIMMLER directly turned to HITLER in order to obtain his own armament plants through his workers in the concentration camps ?

Answer 15: Yes. Because HIMMLER especially appreciated the "nothing is impossible" of the SS, the efforts of HIMMLER were supported for a long time by him.

Question 21: At a meeting with HITLER in January 1944 on the use of manpower [illegible] SPEER made further demands for additional workers despite increased deliveries of iron ore in 1944. Was this increase achieved and was it to be expected in January 1944 ?

Answer 21: At the beginning of 1944 it was already clear that further increase of the iron ore production was impossible.

Question 22: What were the differences of opinion between SAUCKEL and SPEER on the utilization of the occupied territories and on the use of German labor potential ? When did these differences begin ? Did SAUCKEL adapt to SPEER's opinion ?

Answer 22: Over and over again we demanded the employment of German women and elimination of their half-time work. This was opposed again and again by the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment (Gb Arb) with special authority by HITLER - and increased industrial employment of mothers and housewives was rejected.

H0805 - 0036

We could prove without a doubt that not only during the war of 1914 - 18 many more German women were successfully employed in factories and even in heavy industry, but that above all they were included into the working process before 1939 in a higher persentage. But SAUCKEL was of the opinion that the women should be protected for biological reasons and that their morals would suffer from unaccustomed factory work. In the spring of 1943, SPEER was able to obtain HITLER's consent to a considerably increased employment of women and girls in factories. But even then SAUCKEL was able to obstruct the measures agreed upon by internal instructions.

With regard to the questions of production in the occupied territories serious differences of opinion and even disgusting quarrels developed between the Armament Minister and the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment. SPEER and the majority of his co-workers wanted to utilize the places of production particularly with regard to the civil sector in order to free labor in the Reich for pure armament production and furthermore, in order to avoid the many difficulties in connection with the employment of foreign labor. The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment advocated the exact opposite in order to be able to fulfil his obligation to HITLER on making manpower available. The employment office (Arbeitsverpflichtungsstellen) of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment abroad took manpower from the "restricted enterprises" which after long discussions between SAUCKEL and SPEER were finally instituted in order to settle their differences.

Question 23: In the Armament Ministry you were, among other things, in charge of war gas production? When did SPEER discontinue war gas production, and did HITLER give his consent ?

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Answer 23: War gas production, particularly in Gendorf, was discontinued in October or November 1944.

Question 25: SPEER had a conference with the Commander-in-Chief in Italy in September 1944 in Italy where you were also present. Up to that time what demolition of industrial and power installations had been carried out, what was planned for the future, how did SPEER justify his attitude regarding this and with what results ?

Answer 25: In a conference with KESSELRING, SPEER dealt with the question of the destruction of industrial and power installations in great detail. First of all, just as in the late fall of 1943 in Southern Italy, an extensive demolition of all industrial and supply installations was planned by the military in case evacuation of the Po valley should become necessary. At the time of the conference demolition behind the fighting line had not taken place. SPEER was of the opinion that, aside from very few military installations as, for instance, powder and ammunition dumps, which were to be dynamited, Italy's armament and civilian production should only be crippled. The maintenance of the possibility to work was regarded by him as an essential military and humane demand because, either the military situation would demand the utmost utilization of all available capacities or, in case of loosing, we could not expose the friendly Italian population to unspeakable misery. – KESSELRING and his chief agreed with the main points of SPEER's opinion, partially in contrast to the opinion of the General of the technical troops.

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The demolition or the crippling of civilian supply plants was forbidden. A special economic deputy of the Plenipotentiary of the Armament Minister in Italy was attached to KESSELRING's headquarters who was responsible together with the military authorities in every individual case for a possible demolition of industrial installations, their crippling and the execution of such as well as for keeping intact all civilian supply enterprises. Any destruction of power facilities was expressly rejected; even the crippling of such by emptying reservoirs was not decided on.

That is all.

Mr. Burdell:

Question: Will you tell me a few more details what your duties were in the SPEER Ministry ?

Answer: I had to supervise and take care of all factories, 50.000 in all, which furnished these parts, that is, that what was needed for the total war production of Germany: metal, optical, electro technic, machine tools, powder and explosives. Then the distribution of the iron to the various productions in need of this iron.

Question: You were in charge of the factories which produced these things ? Is that correct ?

Answer: Yes – I was responsible for the production, as well as the leadership in these factories.

Question: Did that include factories in the occupied territories ?

Answer: No, only factories in Italy. In the Ministry there was one deputy responsible for the various occupied territories.

I was this deputy for Italy, Mr. KEHRL was responsible for Belgium and France, Mr. SAUR was responsible for the South Eastern territories such as the Protectorate, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

Question: Included among your functions, was it your responsibility to see to it that you had sufficient labor for the factories under your jurisdiction ?

Answer: That came under my jurisdiction and I had to see to it that I had a sufficient amount of labor which I requested from the Minister. There was an office in the Ministry which was there for the sole purpose of channeling my requests to the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment.

Question: Did SPEER see these requests which you made from time to time ?

Answer: Yes. Minister SPEER has always tried to reduce these requests so that I would not have to ask for a greater amount of workers from the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment, which is SAUCKEL.

Question: Do you know how these requests were transmitted to SAUCKEL ? Did Minister SPEER transmit them or did someone else transmit them to SAUCKEL ?

Answer: There was a Mr. SCHMELTER who received the requests for labor forces from these deputies and this Mr. SCHMELTER saw to it that they went to the agencies of SAUCKEL. Minister SPEER always tried to keep away from the daily and weekly requests so that he could take care of the total requests and all the various difficulties which arose personally with SAUCKEL.

Question: So that the requests which were submitted to SAUCKEL's department were broken down in accordance to the jurisdiction of you various gentlemen, is that correct ?

H0805 – 0039

Answer: Yes, they made them individually through Mr. SCHMELTER to SAUCKEL.

Question: And if was your hope and the hope of SPEER that SAUCKEL would distribute workers in accordance with your requests as submitted ? Is that correct ?

Answer: Yes. That is designated as being SAUCKEL's main function.

Question: And the big problem was that SAUCKEL instead of furnishing them strictly in accordance with the requests which you made, distributed them sometimes in accordance with his own plan or scheme ?

Answer: The trouble arose because SAUCKEL maintained that the requests for labor made by these gentlemen were too high. As I said before, we requested German labor forces. SAUCKEL declined this and furnished foreign workers. We did not want any part-time German women. We wanted the women to be taken into the factories for fulltime work. SAUCKEL, for reasons which I have explained in my various questions, did not want this. He wanted to have these women do housework. Sometimes we urgently requested male workers, and he sent women and vice versa. These I believe, are examples sufficient in number to see the difficulties which arose.

Question: You speak of the "red slip system". Will you explain what that system was ?

Answer: In order to reduce these various disputes arising over the insufficient amount of labor being made available, SPEER then requested SAUCKEL to furnish him each month 200,000 workers. We then received 200,000 red tickets from SAUCKEL.

H0805 - 0040

SPEER, through SCHMELTER, sent these red tickets on to the various agencies of the armament industry. I would receive, for instance, out of these red tickets, 40,000. I would then give 5,000 tickets to the chief Committee for Electro Technic, for iron etc. The head of these committees would give these tickets to the Managers of the factories. The factory in fam, would go with these tickets to the Gau labor Office. This Gau labor Office had to take care of the labor demands of these red tickets before they could take care of what they thought they should send to various factories.

Question: When was this plan involving the use of the red tickets adopted ?

Answer: I remember exactly, at the end of 1943.

Question: With respect to the production of the concentration camps, were not there some occasions where SPEER arranged for factories to be placed in the vicinity of concentration camps so that the camp workers could be used in these factories ?

Answer: As far as I know this only pertains to the complete production of air planes. This does not pertain to my industries. They requested repeatedly that they receive camp inmates, and for a very simple reason . Because these were the only remaining skilled workers.

Question: These armament production factories of which you speak in this connection, were under the SPEER Ministry. Is that correct ?

Answer: Yes.

Question: In connection with these requests to Sauckel for workers is it not a fact that SPEER knew at least after 1943, that in order to procure and supply these workers SAUCKEL would have to obtain them from occupied territories ?

Answer: Yes. Because that was the great struggle. They maintained that SAUCKEL made partisans by forcing people to come to work in Germany who did not wish to go there of their own volition.

H0805-0041

Question: With respect to the blocked factories, were not there some occasions when Minister SPEER caused certain blocked factories to be closed and the workers in those blocked factories released so that SAUCKEL could bring them to Germany to work in the plants in Germany ?

Answer: No, I do not know of any such instance and I am quite sure that it did not happen.

Question: How many meetings of the Central Planning Board did you attend ?

Answer: Almost every meeting.

Question: Did some of those meetings concern the distribution of foreign laborers or foreign PW's among various industries ?

Answer: I have stated in my answers that I remember one session and at this session the possibility of bringing foreign laborers into Germany was discussed. At this meeting these gentlemen have fought very hard against the fact that workers would be taken from the blocked factories in the occupied territories to be sent to Germany.

Question: These plants in the occupied territories that you are speaking of were producing armaments, were they not ?

Answer: No. Not only. Mostly as a matter of fact, only civilian production - that is half products and construction parts. Then raw material factories, iron, metal, and then also armament production.

H0805-0042

Question: Where there not some airplane factories in France ?

Answer: I could not say that for sure. I know for a fact there were work shops for airplanes in France.

Question: There were one series of meetings of the Central Planning Board was there not, which concerned itself with the use of Russian PW's for coal mining ?

Answer: The session of the Central Planning Board usually took place quarterly. If need arose ocassionally, special meetings of the Central Planning Board took place . Concerning the furnishing of Russian labor for mines, there was once a meeting of the Central Planning Board. However, I remember only one of the Central Planning Board meetings in which the specific question of further labor which was to be sent to the mines was discussed. The question for the procurement of labor forces for mines was taken up, directly between the Deputy for the Production of Coal and Sauckel. It is only when differences between these two agencies became extremely bad that Minister Speer and the Central Planning Board intevened. This part of the question I have answered in Q.5.

Question: You don't remember the discussions concerning the use of Russian PW's in the coal mines. Is that correct?

Answer: I think that I remember in the meeting of the Central Planning which I mentioned, reference was made to the Russian PW's in the mines.

H0805-0043

Dr. Flaechsner:

Question: You said before that according to your recollection only airplane factories were located near concentration camps. Do you know since when the air production came under the jurisdiction of Min. Speer?

Answer: Yes. The beginning of March 1944, and in effect, since July, approximately.

Question: Were those the 6 fighter planes factories which Mr. Dorsch was supposed to build?

Answer: No. They were different factories. The fighter plane factories were planned in order to secure a complete protection against bombing attacks.

Remark of witness Schieber:

I notified in the course of the interrogation, that I was asked whether the armament factories were under the jurisdiction of Speer. Since this question arose with regard to armament factories attached to concentration camps, I should like to lay stress upon one fact, that the SS-armament factories did not fall under Speer's jurisdiction.

Certified true copy

signed/ DR. HANS FLAECHSNER

typed/ DR. HANS FLAECHSNER

Attorney at law.

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No...52...

(Page 127
of orig.)

Excerpt from Speer Exhibit No.....

Testimony of witness SCHMELTER,
taken on behalf of the Defendant SPEER, by Dr. Hans Flaechsner at Darmstadt, Germany, on 3 April 1946.

Cross-Examination: Mr. Charles S. Burdell, OUSCC.
Interpreter : Mr. Wolfgang THOMANN, IMT.

Dr. Flaechsner to the witness: Do you solemnly swear that the statements you are about to make shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Witness: I do.

Question 1.) Which function did you have in the Ministry of Speer?

Answer 1.) Since December 1943, I was in charge of Labor Committment in the Ministry of Speer. In this connection I dealt with the following tasks: 1) the collection of requests for labor from the various sectors under the jurisdiction of the Speer Ministry of Armament and War Production. These requests were sent to me monthly through the armament inspectorates. The armament inspectorates received the requests from the armament command and the armament command from the individual factories. The overall request was forwarded to Sauckel and Sauckel was informed about the overall requests. 2) Sauckel informed me as to how he could furnish these requests. I then instructed which sections should receive labor forces.

Question 2.) Did the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Committment divide the war industry into various sectors (the so-called "Bedarfsträger" - essential industries and agencies in need of manpower) and did he reserve for himself the immediate negotiations about requests for orders and their allotment to the industries or agencies requiring them?

Answer 2.) The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Committment divided the entire industr into various sectors

H0805 – 0045

and he reserved for himself the immediate negotiations about requests for workers and their allotment to the industries or agencie requesting them. Thus, the Department of Agriculture, the Armed Forces, the Railroads, the Forestry, Mail, and the Armament and War Production dealt separately and individually with the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment. The Armament Ministry comprised the following subsections: Army and Navy Armament; since March 19th also the Air Armament, Mines, Chemistry, Construction, and the so-called war-production; the mines, as well as the construction industry dealt directly with Sauckel.

Question 7.) Did Speer's ministry usually state its requests for workers in the form of a total figure or did it break that figure down into German and foreign workers or PW's and how would Sauckel have reacted to such a classified request?

Answer 7.) The request for workers only occurred in an overall figure; only divided as to male and female.

Question 9.) Did Speer personally further the employment of concentration camp inmates in armament plants?

Answer 9.) As far as I know Speer did not personally further the employment of concentration camp inmates in armament plants.

Question 13) What disagreements existed between Sauckel and Speer concerning the manpower employment policy in the occupied territories and since when did these disagreements exist?

Answer 13) Speer always protested very strongly that Sauckel took away manpower from these blocked factories in France, Belgium and Italy. This question was taken up with Hitler in January 1944. Speer demanded protection for the blocked factories against the taking away of workers in order to protect the civilian production which was put there in the occupied territories.

H0805-0046

Speer always emphasized that he did not care for foreign workers, but that he thought it was better to exhaust the German reserves first. He referred repeatedly that the employment of foreign workers would require greater difficulties in the manufacturing, and additional feeding in the Reich.

Question 14) Who controlled the employment of PW's in accordance with the Geneva Convention?

Answer 14) PW's were employed in accordance with the Geneva Convention. This controlled by the Chief OKW, PW Section.

Question 15) You were formerly a labor trustee. To what extent was a labor trust responsible for the determination of working conditions (e.g. working hours) and how far could such questions be decided in the Speer Ministry? To which office were the labor trustees subordinated?

Answer 15) I was a labor trustee in 1942. The determination of working conditions, for instance - working hours - resulted exclusively through the Reich Labor Ministry. Later on the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment instructed the labor trustees to make specific regulations. Such questions could not be decided in the Speer Ministry

Question 16) What differences of opinion existed between Sauckel and Speer

a) concerning the use of reserves of German manpower, and

b) concerning the system of allocating manpower to the plants and how far did Sauckel submit to Speer's opinion?

Answer 16) a) Speer always maintained that there are still available further reserves of German workers. Especially, according to his opinion, the work of women could still have been increased. So, for instance in the housework again, there were more than 1 million employed in the housework. They were mostly Germans and according to the opinion of Speer could have been transferred over to industry. He demanded from Sauckel a more energetic utilization of these reserves.

H0805 -0047

He constantly reproached Sauckel that the labor offices did not act strongly enough in order to make labor forces available from less important sectors for the industries. Speer has repeatedly shown to Sauckel with specific examples that there were still large reserves employed in less important sectors.

b) Speer has often protested that the allocation of workers by Sauckel did not take place in those factories which were regarded by Speer as being important. Quite frequently, the labor offices sent labor to less important factories. Occasionally the labor offices have taken away workers from armament factories which also resulted in differences of opinion.

In these disagreements Sauckel frequently submitted to Speer's opinion, but later on he acted differently, stating that he was independant and that he did not have to submit to Speer's opinion.

Question 20.) What was the task of the "Bedarfpruefungskommissionen". (Investigation Commissions for use of labor)?

Answer 20.) The task of the "Investigations commissions" was first to control if the need requested by the factory was justified; second — if the factory had too many workers and could give up workers to other factories.

That is all.

Mr. Burdell:

Question: You said that Sauckel repeatedly told Speer that the recruiting of workers abroad was carried on in a legal manner. Were you present at any such discussion?

Answer: No. I was very rarely present at discussions between Sauckel and Speer.

Question: So you did not ever hear Sauckel tell Speer that the procurement of workers abroad was carried on in a legal manner; is that correct?

Answer: Yes. I only know it because Speer told me that afterwards.

H0805-0048

Question : Do you mean to say that you and Minister Speer were under the impression that workers were being procured from abroad only voluntarily?

Answer : Yes. Sauckel said repeatedly, even when he was not asked about it, that the recruiting was done freely and that the workers liked to come to Germany.

Question : Then it is your testimony, on your oath, that you never knew that workers were being made to come to Germany involuntarily?

Answer : We did not have anything to do with recruiting abroad.

Question : I still don't understand the answer to the last question. Did you or did you not know that workers were being made to come to Germany involuntarily?

Answer : No.

Question : You believe that all came to Germany willingly and voluntarily?

Answer : Yes.

Question : And that is your testimony under uour oath? Is that correct?

Answer : Yes.

Question : You have said that the requirements for workers were submitted to you and that you in turn submitted them to Sauckel? Is that correct ?

Answer : Yes. The total requirement.

Question : Can you tell us how often or at what periods of time you submitted requests to Sauckel?

Answer : Once every month.

Question : Generally, you submitted just a figure for the number of workers that you wanted, is that correct?

Answer : Yes, the total figure.

Question : Occasionally, broken down into male and female?

Answer : Yes

Question : Did you ever specifically ask for workers from abroad?

Answer : At the most, some specialists. In other words,

H0805-0049

if they heard that there were specialists available in Italy they would say that if we need specialists these specialists would be sent to Germany.

Question : Did you ever ask for PW's?

Answer : Yes. But not through Sauckel's office, but through the Chief OKW, PW Section.

Question : Did Speer know that you made requests for PW's at the OKW?

Answer : Not specifically.

Question : Did you ever ask the SS for laborers from concentration camps?

Answer : No. The SS offered them.

Question : And you took them - is that correct?

Answer : Yes. I said which factories were in need for them and where they were to be sent. The committment at those factories was done by the SS. I had to know this, because the requirement of the factory would be covered and I then had to check off this request.

Question : You have said that Speer opposed the use of foreign workers. His principal reasons for this were as follows, were they not: 1) that it took workers away from the blocked factories; 2) that Speer bolived that there was still labor available in Germany?

Answer : Yes.

Question : Were those the principal and main reasons that Speer gave for being opposed to the use of foreign workers?

Answer : I have mentioned 3 more reasons: The additional lodging, difficulties in production, for instance, language difficulties and learning it, and the additional feeding. For these reasons Speer did not think it was necessary to bring foreign workers to Germany.

H0805 - 0050

Question : And these five reasons were the principal reasons given by Speer for his opposition?

Answer : As far as I can remember, yes. I cannot think at the moment of any other reason.

Question : Did you ever go with Sauckel on any of his trips to occupied territories?

Answer : Yes

Question : Where did you go with him ?

Answer : France and Italy. I just happened to meet Sauckel in Italy. I was mostly sent to France by Speer in order to prevent workers from being taken away from blocked factories. This was also one of the reasons for my trips to Italy.

Question : Did you ever go to the East?

Answer : Yes, but alone, without Sauckel. I was only in the East at the time before I was appointed to the Ministry, when I was still with the OT. After December 1943 I was not in the East any more.

Question : Did you have occasion to talk to Sauckel from time to time concerning the procurement of foreign workers?

Answer : I went to Sauckel once every month or two, whenever he assembled all the representatives of the various ministries. Otherwise, I only went to him with specific requests from Speer. We have discussed very many problems. Also the problem of labor recruitment.

Question : And upon these occasions did Sauckel tell you about the difficulties he was having in obtaining workers from the occupied territories?

Answer : Yes, he alsways complained; especially about the difficulties made by German offices, especially the Speer offices. Especially he complaindabout the difficulties in the blocked factories in France.

H0805-0051

Question : Upon these occasions did not Sauckel tell you that it was impossible to get workers to come to Germany willingly and voluntarily?

Answer : No. He always emphasized that they came voluntarily and at the end when no more came he finally admitted that it was no longer possible to bring any more workers into Germany from abroad.

Question : When did Sauckel admit that it was no longer possible to bring more workers to Germany from abroad?

Answer : At the end of 1944 approximately.

Mr. Burdell:

Dr. Flaechsner, this officer tells me that they would like to close the building, and that he would like to have us complete the interrogation now if we can. If you have just one or two more questions, I suggest that you ask them and we can consider later on whether or not we will remain over and continue this interrogation tomorow.

H0805-0052

Dr. Flaechsner:
Very good.

Question : Did you handle labor and employment questions while you were in the East with the OT?

Answer : Yes, but only the employment of German workers with the OT work projects and the employment of foreigners and the work projects of the OT in the East. The OT did not undertake any construction works in Germany at that time.

Question : Were those foreigners, whom you employed in the East, in the OT recruited freely?

Answer : Yes. Since they were employed in their own homeland.

That is all.

Certified true copy

Dr. HANS FLAECHSNER

Dr. HANS FLAECHSNER

Attorney at law.

H0805-0053

H0805-0054

SPEER DOKUMENT NR. 53 (page 136)
SPEER Exhibit Nr. .....
Excerpt from:
Testimony of Theo HUPFAUER, taken at Horsbruck, Germany, 10 May 1946, by Dr Hans FLAECHSNER and Mr. Charles S. Burc
Interrogators.
Further present: Jan P. CHARMATZ

Dr. FLAECHSNER to the Witness:

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Witness: I do.

Question 2 : What were the tasks of the SPEER Ministry in factories? Which offices were responsible for social problems and for a bearable utilization of manpower ?

Answer 2 : The SPEER Ministry had only the technical tasks in the factories. The most essential task was to rationalize the factories. Furthermore the SPEER Ministry controlled the output of the factory. The The question of the general welfare was under the jurisdiction of the General Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment, the Reich Labor Ministry, and the German Labor Front.

Question 3 : Who, for instance, determined the working hours of Germans, of foreigners and of prisoners of war ?

Answer 3 : The establishment of the working hours for all workers was the task of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment. His decision was a general one. Within the general scope of this determination, the factories of the same kind determined the wor hours.

Question 4 : Was greater work out-put demanded of foreign laborers and PW's th of the German laborer ?

Answer 4 : I don't know of any decree, or article which determined other working hours for foreign laborers, PW's than for the German workers.

H0805-0055

Question 18 : Was SPEER's position as technical chief considered by leading political circles of the party as an important political mission for SPEER ? What was his political weight and on what do you base your observations ?

Answer 18 : I am convinced that SPEER was appointed chief of the main office "Technik", because in general he was made successor to Dr. Todt. I don't remember any event, in which SPEER was conspicuous in this position, and I do not think that the party circles consi the main office "Technik" politically important.

Question 21 : Can you state what SPEER averred in confidential talks with representatives of the armament industry and manufacturers in Februar 1945, regarding the food situation and what measures he took in the "Zentrale" ?

Answer 21 : SPEER took upon himself the personal direction of the transportation staff. I think it was in February 1945, and thereby had an essential influence upon the regulation of transports. In this capacity SPEER ordered that from now on in order to secure the life of the population that all food stuff should hove priority A, and even that armaments should come after the questions of feeding the people.

Question 23 : Did there exist according to your impressions, the danger of extensive destructions of industrial and supply establishme (e.g.Florian) ?

Answer 23 : There was the danger of extensive destruction, because the military agencies, and the agencies of the Party took the attitude that the Fuehrer's orders had to be complied with under all circumstances.

Question 24: What were SPEER's activities in the last phase of the war based on and what could have been the result of his resignation?

Answer 24: The motivation for SPEER's activities in the last phase of the war was given by SPEER himself with the following words: "The people have done their duty in this war. They proved their value as no other people of the world. If this war is lost, it is a consequence due to the failure of the leaders. The leaders, therefore, have the duty to preserve the basis for life of the people under all circumstances. In my capacity as responsible minister of production I must take steps to see that the production goes on under all circumstances." If SPEER had resigned in this situation, this task would not have been performed with the same devotion and self-sacrifice. According to my conviction, SPEER was not allowed to resign, and I told him personnally several times he most probably was the only one who had the courage to oppose this order, and was able to render an important service to the German nation.

Mr. BURDELL:

Question: What was your position in the SPEER Ministry?

Answer: I was Chief of the Central Department of the Reichministry for Armament and War Productions.

Question: When did you take over that position?

Answer: I took it over in October 1944. My official appointment was in December 1944.

Question: What were your positions in the ministry prior to that time?

Answer: Prior to this time I was "Amtsleiter" in the Central Office of the German Labor Front, and at the same time Department Chief in the Ministry of Armaments.

Question: Did your duties ever include acting as contact or liaison man between the SPEER Ministry and the Labor Front?

H0805-0056

Answer: Yes, I was the liaison man between the Armament Ministry and the German Labor Front.

Question: You said that SPEER could not give SAUCKEL orders, but is it not a fact that it was SAUCKEL's function and SAUCKEL's duty to furnish manpower when SPEER asked for it?

Answer: SAUCKEL's duty was in a general way to mobilize manpower, but he had not only to cover SPEER's requirements, but also those of other agencies which needed manpower with the same importance, as the railroads, agriculture, Reichspost, and the armaments, which up to 1944 were not subordinated to SPEER, or the airforce armament.

Question: Then your answer to my question was simply, yes, it was SAUCKELs duty to furnish SPEER manpower when SPEER asked for it?

Answer: Yes. He quoted his claim and SAUCKEL had to fulfill them, which never happened.

Question: You mean, that SAUCKEL never fully furnished the requirements, do you not?

Answer: No, at no time. We always had a considerable number of uncovered red slips.

Question: But SAUCKEL did furnish some workers in response to SPEER's request, is that correct?

Answer: For the armament.

Question: Now you said that the figures which the SPEER Ministry turned over to SAUCKEL were obtained from the Armament Inspectorates, is that correct and the main committees?

Answer: Yes, but in the last analysis they came from the factories. There were two channels from the factory: one to the main committees, and the other through the Armament Inspectorates. But both channels ended in the Armament Ministry of SPEER.

H0805-0057

H0805-0058

Q.: Now, both the Armament Inspectorates and the main committees were under the SPEER Ministry, and were part of the SPEER Ministry, is that correct ?

A.: Yes, the main committees were self-governing organs of the industry.

Q.: Did the armament plants establish some camps for the foreign workers ?

A.: Yes, the foreign workers were billeted by the armament industry, and the German Labor Front also had camps, but those camps were transferred more and more to the factories; to take care of workers was the function of the factories.

Q.: And these camps that were established by the factories, were they under the SPEER Ministry ? or under the DAF?

A.: No, the Armament Ministry could not give any directives, but it could express its desires to the governments and the DAF, the German Labor Front. The Armament Ministry was a purely technical and economic ministry If SPEER founded this department for the acknowledgement of the accomplishments, this was only to do some additional work for the long working hours and special accomplishments; the German Labor Front proposed this establishment.

Q.: Where you had foreign workers alone, or working together and not mixed with German workers, in those cases did not foreign workers work longer hours than the German workers?

A.: I personally do not know of any case in which the foreign workers were separated entirely from the German workers, except in cases of prisoners of war, maybe.

Q.: What about the concentration camps, were they separated in those cases ?

A.: They were separated there as an independent section of the plant not in the normal shift.

H0805-0059

Q.: And do you know what their hours were in those cases? Were they in there not longer than those of the German workers, or just the same ?

A.: I don't think it existed over twelve hours, because in order to work continuously a shift is not over twelve hours, or eight hours, you use the machinery 100%, and also there were less and less foremen, and in order to make full use of them you had shifts of 12 hours.

Q.: Do you know how long or at what period the workers in the concentration camps began to work the 12 hours shift, or did they always work twelve hour shift ?

A.: I do not know.

That is all.

Certified true copy.

s/DR. HANS FLAECHSNER
s/DR. HANS FLAECHSNER

Attorney at law.

H0805-0060

SPEER Document No.54. SPEER Exhibit No ....

Excerpt from:
Testimony given by witness SAUR for the Defendant SPEER on 2 May, 1946 at Kransberg.
Interrogation by Dr. Hans FLASCHSNER.
Cross-Interrogation by Mr. Charles S. BURDELL.
Interpreter: Mr. Wolfgang THORMANN.

Witness and interpreter have been duly sworn in.

Dr. FLASCHSNER:

Question 1: What were the position you occupied in SPEER Ministry and in the Head Office for Technical Industry (Hauptamt fuer Technik) and since when did you occupy them?

Answer 1: ..... In connection with the voluminous preparatory tasks for the "Haus der Deutschen Technik", I took over as an honor task in the beginning of 1939 the representation of TODT in the Main Office for Engineering and NSBDT (National Socialist Society of German Engineers).

.....When shortly afterwards, the Office of a "Reichsminister for Armament and Munitions" was created with Dr. TODT in charge, I took over the administration of the industrial section, at first, only the sub-sections of the Production of Ammunition, Weapons and Tanks. After the death of TODT, when the Ministry was taken over by SPEER, and the amount of work administered was essentially enlarged, the latter transferred to me the direction of his technical office for the finishing of Armaments for the Army-Production and the working out of all questions of rationalisation. In summer 1943 the administration of the Navy Armament became an additional task. In spring 1944 I became chief of staff of the "Jaegerstab". In summer 1944 the amount of tasks of the Ministry was enlarged and the whole armament in the air-sector was placed under the direction of the technical office.

In connection with the founding of the Armament staff, of which I became vice-director and chief of staff, there were added in August 1944 machines and motors and finally in Nov.1944 the iron-producing, iron-manufacturing industry, and the electrical industry.

At the same time I remained SPEER's deputy in the chief office for technical industry and in the NSBDT (National Socialist Society of German Engineers) and in the Society House of German Engineering, after the direction of these three institutes was transferred to him.

Question 3: What was the task of the main office for technics, what role did the technical scientific organizations play therein, and up to what point did the presidents or members of these organizations have to be members of the NSDAP?

Answer 3: The task of the main office for technics was the uniform coordination of the organizations for technical industry to care for German engineers from the scientific professional and political point of view. The technical-scientific organizations remained inside the NSBDT (National Socialist Society of German Engineers) as free, registered societies and with much independence. For the presidents and managers of the technical organizations and work-groups, membership in the NSDAP was prescribed. A few exceptions were permitted. The members of the executive committees of the organizations were not obliged to belong to the NSDAP. The membership of these technical scientific organizations was at no time made dependent on membership in the NSDAP.

Question 4 to 7 What were SPEER's activities as head of the main office for technical industry, what were the instructions which he gave to the main-office or its sub-sections. What correspondence did SPEER have as head of the main office for technical industry?

H0805-0061

Did the main office for technical industry have an influence on the Ministry SPEER corresponding to the motto: "the Party governs the State"? Up to what degree were the activities of the main office for technical industry upheld during SPEER's time?

Answer 4 to 7

.....To avoid any overlapping and any possible duplication, SPEER attached from the beginning great importance to the fact that the "Gauamtsleiter" for technic in their capacity as Wehrkreis-Commissioners were exclusively branch-offices of the Ministry. ..... The decree 1/43 of 22 February 1943 gives an idea of the tasks involved and their execution. It reads as follows: "Decree L/43"

To the "Hauptamt fuer Technik" and the Reich Administration of the NSBDT

Office for Technical sciences

To the "Gauaemter fuer Technik" and Gau Administrations of the NSBDT".

"Gauhaeuser" of Technic

Trade Associations and work circles of the NSBDT

....The Chiefs of the Gauaemter for Technic in their capacity as Wehrkreis-Commissioners or deputy Wehrkreis-Commissioners respectively have to adapt their work exclusively to the tasks set by the Reichsminister for Armament and Munitions.

....Until further notice, the work of the technical-scientific associations and work circles and the houses of technic must be adapted exclusively to the requirements necessitated by the war. As I, in my capacity as Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions direct also the technical tasks to my technical office or to my commissions, central committees and main circles respectively, the performance of tasks at any given time must be adapted to them.

H0805-0062

Out of the state of affairs described above, it proved by itself that a correspondence of SPEER in his capacity as chief of the central office for technic was limited to single occasions in which the priority of technical claims made it necessary.

The almost entire transfer of the leading tasks from the political organizations of the Technics to the Ministry can also be seen out of the fact that SPEER only once and that for a few days after his appointment visited the Agency of the Central Office for Technics, of the NSBDT and of the House for Technics in Munich.

Question 10: What amount of iron-contingent was approximately assigned in spring 1944 to: a) production of ammunition,

b) production of arms,

c) production of tanks,

d) production of airplanes,

e) production of warships

c) production of general equipment for the Armed Forces without the preparations of the factories, and how much iron was altogether distributed in this period?

Answer 10:

Ammunition	approx	465,000 tons
Arms	"	100,000 "
Tanks	"	160,000 "
Airplanes	"	100,000 "
Shipconstruction	"	100,000 "
General Armed Forces	"	180,000 "
Equipment		
(without signal equipment		1,105,000 "
total contingent		2,560,000 "

Mr. BURDELL's crossexamination:

Question: What do you understand under "self-responsibility of the industry"?

H0805-0063

H0805-0064

Answer: The Ministry for Armament and War Production under the direction of Dr. TODT as well as especially after SPEER's appointment was ordered by Adolf HITLER to lead the armament in a more extensive way than up to that time not by officials and military agencies, but by individuals connected with industry. This is how the system called "Responsibility of the German Industry" came about. Thousands of honorary assistants were leading the different groups of production, remaining in their respective positions. This measure led to an increase of production which was previously believed to be impossible even in the plans of the military agencies.

Question: Did the number of workers increase after SPEER's appointment or did it decrease?

Answer: The number of workers increased, but not in proportion to production. The figures may be given as follows:

	Beginning 1942		Fall 1944
Army	1.7	millions	2.3
Air	1.7	"	2.1
Navy	0.6	"	0.5
	4.0	"	4.9 millions

Thus, the number of workers increased only approximately 900,000, while the production increased approximately fivefold during the same period of time.

Question: Where did the workers come from?

Answer: The allotments procured through SAUCKEL, came from seperate mobilizations, at first partly from Russia, then from the first mobilization of German reserves in the spring of 1943, then after

H0805-0065

the capitulation of Italy, and at last from the second mobilization of German reserves which took place in August 1944. The number of PW workers was relatively small and figured according to my recollection ater 1942 at about 100,000. The figures quoted only concern factories under the supervision of the armament inspectorates and therefore not the over-all production under the jurisdiction of the ministry, nevertheless, they include a number of industries which did not deal with armament production directly, such as electrotechnics, general equipment etc.

In judiging the figures, it is to be regarded that in the course of the war, the methods of supervision of industries has been changed several times, the number of factories under the jurisdiction of the armament inspectorates largely increased since the classification between Regional Economic Office and armament inspectorates changed several times and was handled differently. - Thus, e.g. workers employed in the AA gun production appeared under the airforce workers and later under army labor.

Question: Is it correct that a number of these workers came from France?

Answer: The number of workers who came from France were included therein. On this subject, records are available concerning disputes between SAUCKEL and SPEER where SPEER refused to recruit workers from FRANCE, because they were only taken from the production there. In April 1944, it was fixed in a meeting with Adolf HITLER that we did not want to recruit any labor from FRANCE since by reasonable grounds production orders were allocated thereto.

I may suggest that I cannot give any exact statements as to labor matters since I had nothing to do with it. But Mr. HUPFAUER and Mr. SCHMELTER are able to do it. In the records located here, numerous exact files and transcripts of sessions with SAUCKEL can be found.

Certified true copy:
s/ Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER
t/ Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER
Attorney-at-Law.

H0805-0066

SPEER Exhibit No.....
Excerpt
Testimony of witness Gerhard FRAENK taken on behalf of the defendant SPEER, by Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER at Interment Camp 74, Ludwigsburg, on 4 April 1946.

Cross-Examination: Mr. Charles S. BUI
Interpreter: : Mr. Wolfgang THOR

Dr. FLAECHSNER: Mr. THORMANN, do you state on your oath that you will accurately and faithfully interpret, from German into English, the questions about to be propounded to this witness and the answers given thereto ?

Mr. THORMANN: I do.

Dr. FLAECHSNER to the witness: Do you solemnly swear that the statements you are about to make shall be the truth, the wh truth, [illegible] and nothing but the trut so help you God ?

Witness : I do.

Question 1 : What position did you have in the Ministry of SPEER in spring 1944 ?

Answer 1 : In spring 1944 I was head of the department "Organization and Administration" in the central office of the Ministry.

Question 2 : What order did Mr. DORSCH receive from HITLER directly during SPEER's illness, and how far was SPEER concerned with that matter and what was his attitude with regard to it?

Answer 2 : HITLER wanted to shift manufacture of air armament, particularl the manufacture of motors and parts to newly provided bomb-proo concrete buildings. SPEER pointed out that neither the necessar building material nor the labor needed for such an extensive building program were available and aside from this giving absolute priority to this program would seriously imperil all other construction including that for the removal of damage from air.

During SPEER's illness DORSCH made designs for air armament buildings planned by HITLER, selected buildings sites favorably located as regards transportation and procurement of building materials, and without SPEER's knowledge obtained an interview with GOERING on these questions.

H0805-0067

Ostensibly GOERING was filled with enthusiasm for DORSCH's plans, made a report to HITLER about it, and arranged an interview for DORSCH with HITLER. HITLER also approved the proposals and ordered DORSCH and GOERING to hold a conference in Berchtesgaden with all departments concerned to determine the projects and to eliminate all ensuing difficultie In doing so HITLER made DORSCH personnally responsible to/him (HITLER) for the construction of the buildings, particularly for keeping within the limits of time. SPEER, as the Commissioner General for the regulation of constructi was to be instructed to fulfil all demands made by DORSCH for the execution of this program. Up to this point SPEER was completely left out of the whole matter. All these conferences were held without including or informing SPEER

Q. 3 : What did SPEER want to do as the result of this order and with what mission did he send you to Berchtesgaden ?

A. 3 : At that time SPEER told me that in case of such an order by HITLER, he would refuse further responsibility for construction. DORSCH should take over this task because he had a strong ambition in this direction anyway. SPEER wrote a detailed memorandum to HITLER, once more elaborating on the air armament construction program planned by HITLER and GOERING ans asked HITLER in case the program was maintained, to relieve him of the responsibility for all construction and to entrust Mr. DORSCH with the execution of the same.

Q. 6: Do you know HITLER's letter to SPEER concerning this matter?

A. 6: Yes. HITLER's letter to SPEER of 21 April 1944 is know to me. I have here a copy of the first draft sent by HITLER to SPEER and this letter gave rise to the memo prepared by SPEER which I referred to above

H0805-0068

as being a detailed memorandum to HITLER by SPEER elaborating on the air armament construction program planned by HITLER and GOERING and asking HITLER in case the program was maintained, to relieve him of the responsibility for all construction and to entrust Mr. DORSCH with the execution of the same.

Mr. BURDELL:

Q.: At this time, what was DORSCH'S position in the Ministry?

A.: DORSCH was Executive under SPEER of the OT.

Q.: Can you tell us how you got all your information about this whole problem? Was it through conversations with SPEER chiefly that you got your information ?

A.: Yes. SPEER was recovering in Meran and he called me on Sunday evening at 2230 at my house, and he told me that I should be in Meran on Tuesday noon. He calle again one hour later and told me to be there on Monday.

Q.: Can you say that practically all of your information about this whole problem came from SPEER personally ?

A.: Yes.

Q.: What was the principal reason that SPEER was against this underground construction ?

A.: Because he thought that the execution of this construction as desired by HITLER and GOERING would endanger the rest of all the construction program.

Q.: Can you tell us approximtely when the discussions about the thing started ? Not the construction, but the whole discussion about it which led up to this letter of HITLER's ?

A.: That must have been 3 or 4 weeks before the letter.

H0805-0069

Q.: You said that as a result of these problems or disagreements SPEER felt that he would just as soon resign. Is that correct ? is that what you sai

A.: Yes. Under these conditions SPEER would not have cooperated.

Q.: Was that the only reason that you know of for SPEER's wish to resign ?

A.: There were many differences with DORSCH. Already when SPEER was in the hospital at Hohenlychen he sent a letter to HITLER in which he complained about the disloyalty of DORSCH.

Q.: Aside from these differences with DORSCH do you know of any other reason that SPEER wished to resign ?

A.: Lateron also again after HITLER issued the order about the "scorched earth".

Q.: Are those the only things which you know of what led to SPEER's wish to resign?

A.: As far as I know, yes.

Q.: Was this job of constructing the underground plants ever started and fini

A.: They were supposed to have been partially completed. As far as I know they have not been completed.

Q.: Under whose direction was the construction which was done on them, carrie on ?

A.: Under DORSCH, and under DORSCH, in turn, were local construct/ion managers.

H0805-0070

Q.: In connection with the construction of this project, did DORSCH continue to be subordinate to SPEER ?

A.: Yes.

Q.: So that despite all the arguments and disagreements there were about it, the project was nevertheless carried on under the authority of SPEER ?

A.: Yes.

Dr. FLAECHSNER:

Q.: Is it true that this project of the construction of fighter planes was discussed and carried out in the second part of 1943 after heavy bombardments ?

A.: I know that approximately from this time on these ideas were expressed. How far it was carried out practically, I do not know.

Q.: In order not to have any misunderstandings, these discussions in Berchtesgaden were carried out mainly by you, that is to say as long as it does not concern the personal talk of SPEER with HITLER?

A.: My activity in Berchtesgaden was limited to forwarding the memo of SPEER to BORMANN so that it could be presented to HITLER. And it also was limited to instruct Milch and Saur, both of whom were in Berchtesgaden, and who in their turn, talked about this question with HITLER, and who caused HITLER to receive SPEER.

That is all.

Certified true copy.

s/ Dr. HANS FLAECHSNER
t/ Dr. HANS FLAECHSNER

(Attorney-at-law)

H0805-0071

SPEER
Document No. 56

SPEER Exhibit No. .....

Excerpt from:

Testimony of Walter ROHLAND, taken at Nurnberg, 20 May, 1946, looo to 122o, by Charles S. BURDELL, Interrogator. Also present Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER, Jan P. CHARMATZ, Theodore LIT, Interpreter.

Mr. BURDELL to the witness:

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

I do.

Dr. FLAECHSNER

Question 1. In the ministry of SPEER, you were honorary director of the Department Steel Production and deputy of the Plenipotentiary for Armament Industry in the Rhine- Ruhr territory. You were present at the Gauleiter convention in the summer of 1943, at which demands were made by SPEER and his associates?

Answer 1. This matter concerns itself with the Gauleiter convention of October 6, 1943. SPEER pointed out especially the seriousness of the situation and stated that such depended upon the political leadership and its understanding. With his associates, he submitted the following requests: a) Mobilization of German labor, including women. b) Restrictions in the manufacture of civilian goods and the transfer of same outside Germany. c) The use of foreigners is and will remain an emergency measure. Looked at from the point of view of nourishment, it is a burden, because in addition to the lodging for foreigners in the first place, specific calories must be provided for them in order that they might produce anything. Supplementary calories were necessary in order to reach the goal of subsequent production. Before supplementary foreigners are brought into the Reich, the German labor reserve in the form of women and men, not employed in work necessary to the war,

H0805-0072

should be completely utilized from trades and from over-staffed administration offices to the last German capable of work. In spite of all this, it is necessary that foreigners be brought into work in all cases. Sufficient nourishement, decent lodging etc. must be assured inasmuch as only under these conditions can pleasure in work be guaranteed. SPEER, with emphasis, pointed out in this connection the remarkable example which England and the United States offered in this connection. There were two conventions which took place and I was present at the one which took place on 6 October 1943.

Question 4. Which demands were made by SPEER and yourself following a discussion with HITLER and why did these efforts fail?
Answer 4. Following discussions with Adolf HITLER similar demands were made whereby in particular the over-staffing of the administrative and party-posts and the extreme production of consumer goods for daily use was criticized in the sharpest form. At the same time practical suggestions were made for the commitment of female labor. (The doing away of women doing part-time work, etc.) This also included the reduction of administrative offices and the elimination of double tasks and superfluous office personnel. Suggestions were made for the decrease in the civilian sphere consolidation. With just as much emphasis, SPEER pointed out in this connection the fact that the doing away of party offices was not yet carried through. He mentioned the expenditures - the considerable expence amounts, (Byzantinism) the employment of Germans for the special wishes of the political offices and demanded in particular by the people politically responsible - of them above all the political leadership

H0805-0073

not only in words, but in deeds show the people who had to produce, an example through their way of living, which in no way seemed to be the situation at that time.

Hitler admitted in principle that the situation critized was so. He rejected, however, the committment of woman labor insofar as his own feelings were concerned and could not believe that the administrative employees could still produce anything of volume in the shops and could not believe that white collar workers would be able to do any effective work as factory workers. In no way did critical measures come into question.

On the following day, the Gauleiters themselves called on Adolf HITLER and put forth their own point of view, which was conditioned by their personal wishes.

As an explanation for the negative attitude of the Gauleiters the following might be mentioned. As a result of the favourable course of the first two years of the war, no one believed in the necessity of carrying out the war as a total war. This applied in particular as to the question of labor and the reduction of consumers needs. There prevailed the greatest mistrust against all demands of the SPEER Ministry and of the administrative organizations of industry, combined with the greatest disrespect of the capabilities of the experts. This went so far that the demand of the SPEER Ministry for supplementary workers was no longer taken seriously. Some reproached him with the charge that the industrialists for reason of comfort or conv enience held for themselves the skilled labor, hereby sabotaging the demand of the army, also that the manpower requirements reported were exaggerated in every respect. Most of the Gauleiters were obsessed with personal ambition and a desire for power. They, and their political associates, out of egotistical grounds, opposed every unpopular measure and were in no way agreeable to themselves trying anything for the good of the whole community, or trying any kind of measures that were not favorable to the Gauleiters and their own persons.

H0805-0074

In this connection, they found at that time particular support from BORMANN and also from Adolf HITLER.
The point of view of the Gauleiters was conditioned by the basic attititude that the demands placed by SPEER for a total war would weaken the resistence power of the people.

Question 5. You worked with SPEER on the prevention of the destruction projects. What circles represented a serious danger inasmuch as they might carry out HITLER's orders and what were the objectives in particular?

Answer 5. With the increasing danger of the occupation of German territory, there arose in the highest party posts (BORMANN), with a considerable number of Gauleiters and in the posts of the SS, the idea of a scorched earth policy which would have meant complete destruction of all valuable things after the Russian model.
In September 1944 corresponding regulations were submitted to the Gauleiters of the East by BORMANN. SPEER and his associates stood in the sharpest contradiction to this point of view, taking this position from the knowledge, that in the final analysis, the leadership had failed and as a consequence did not have the right to decide on the course of the nation, which in faith in the leadership had carried out its decisions in an inconceivable manner.
SPEER had the point of view, consequently, that it was his duty to do everything for this nation for whom he had a great respect and to do everything to maintain the possibilities of life even after the war was lost. (Motto: Maintenance of Substance)
From September 1944 on, these points of view stood in sharpest opposition to each other, whereby the thought of complete evacuation and of the scorched earth plan was partially represented in the west by Gauleiter SIMON (Moselland), GROHE (Cologne) and FLORIAN (Duesseldorf) and their political offices.

H0805-0075

Under the slogan, the war is only to be won if the occupied industrial areas are once again to be conquered and this had meaning only if we are able once again to put industry into operation, SPEER and his associates did everything successfully under the slogan. People must work right up to the period before the occupation by the enemy. At the same time, the complete evacuation with all its miseries was completely limited.

On the basis of HITLER's decree of March 19, 1945, this was in final analysis HITLER's answer to SPEER's memo of March 15, 1945, which left the point of view of BORMANN and the Gauleiters completely fulfilled. The danger reached its highest point inasmuch as the power to issue decrees, regarding these activities, now went over to the political bureau. In the west, it was again the above-mentioned Gauleiters who now sought to destroy everything including the agricultural installations. SCHLESSMANN, ESSEN, HOFFMANN, DORTMUND were more of SPEER's point of view, while MEYER, MUNSTER was finally allied with the more extreme point of view.

Question 6. Which measures were carried out by SPEER and yourself in order to prevent the execution of this order?

Answer 6. Before 19 March 1945 the measures in the west were applied, especially in the Gaus Moselland, Cologne, and Duesseldorf areas. Through corresponding regulations, the iron industries in Lorraine, Luxembourg and Saar were rescued.

At the appointment of Dr. VOEGLER in November 1944 as Plenipotentiary General for the Armament in the Rhein/Ruhr-territory, SPEER expressed clearly his attitude toward these questions to all the Ruhr experts there. The consequence of this speech was that even the timid characters gathered the courage to act in accordance with SPEER's point of view.

H0805-0076

On 27 February 1945, SPEER discussed in small circles in the Schloss Landsberg/Ruhr, details for the corresponding measures to be taken in the Ruhr area, among other things taking care of the population. (Regarding nutrition taking precedence over production and armament measures). The SPEER Ministry placed tommyguns at the disposal of his associates.

The Fuehrer's decree of 19 March 1945 reached SPEER when he was on a trip to the west in Kesselring's headquarters. He interrupted his journey immediately in order to attempt to effect contrary decrees in Berlin. Inasmuch as the danger of total disintegration had increased considerably, I requested that SPEER come immediately to the Ruhr for the purpose of the establishment of further counter measures.

SPEER arrived the night of 24/25 March 1945 and on that very night the following was brought about : 1) Directives were issued that the explosives and fuses be destroyed and that the release of mines for explosive units be prevented, and 2) The already prepared explosive installations for the docks in HAMBORN be withdrawn. General directives to all the offices of SPEER and particularly to the Ruhr staff to work against the decrees of 19 March 1945 at all times. After SPEER returned to Berlin, he achieved new corresponding enactment regulations on 20 March 1945. True these regulations - these extreme measures - could be thwarthed through legal measures. Despite this, the Gauleiters FLORIAN, GROHE and to an extent MEYER, held to their points of view. It is clear that as a result of the activities of SPEER and his close associates, just as in the west the Reich, industrial institutions and supply institutions were to a great extent saved from total destruction.

Question 8. Which conversations did SPEER have with you concerning the meaning of his task in this period, and which position did he formerly take in political questions?

H0805-0077

Answer 8. I had the first general conversation concerning the seriousness of the situation shortly before the meeting of Posen (October 1943), during which SPEER with the utmost frankness called attention to the danger of an unfavorable end of the war.

During SPEER's sickness, I had a second conversation with SPEER (about the middle of March, 1944) during which, for the first time the hopelessness of the fight, on account of the systematization of the new air-raids and the idea of the maintaining by all means of the life of the people, even after a lost war, was discussed.

In connection with the fight for the Ruhr, the words "Maintaining of the Substance", which had to be decisive for all our actions, was expressed for the first time.

When in June 1944, due to various reasons, I put at SPEER's disposal the offices which I occupied as my share of the responsibility of the economy, the latter declared that precisely during this difficult time he could not in any case do without those men of the industry who enjoyed his special confidence. At that, he was convinced, that the war could not any longer be won by Germany, on the other hand, he would not give up hope at that time that an understanding could be arranged with the enemy powers. So long as there existed a spark of hope to circumvent the dreadful alternative of unconditional surrender, he had to demand from every decentminded German, as he did from himself, that he give his everything for the nation.

Further discussions followed after the armament conference in Linz (July, 1944) in connection with his fight against the insane idea already ordered in early September of "scorched earth" policy.

H0805-0078

It was here that the controversy between SPEER and the high command crystallized itself even more sharply. He was of the opinion that even at this critical moment precisely the thoughtful men, disregarding their own danger, should stand by him in his fight against the high command totally blinded in its radicalism. The foolish idea of depriving the German people after a lost war of the possibility for future existence by destroying themselves should be avoided at all cost.

Apart from the short discussion concerning the conference in Posen, (October 1943) SPEER, since 1944, has not discussed any political questions with me. Only the constantly growing realization of an unfavorable outcome of the war and the resulting attitude of the high command induced SPEER to renounce his as yet strictly adhered-to policy of handling exclusively economic problems caused by the war. Just as for any other conscientious German, for him was fulfillment of his duty to his fatherland - self-evident. This fulfilling of one's duty to the very last, greatly emphasized by the United Nations' demand for unconditional surrender was decisive in his carrying on, even if Germany's victory seemed excluded.

Question 9. You once said that you had no influence whatsoever in regard to the questions of the allocations as to the kind and number of workers. Did SPEER's Ministry have any influence on the manner of the procurement?

Answer 9. No. SAUCKEL had the power, as regards the allocation of the trained labor contingents and he could determine the needs of the various agencies involved, for instance, the nutrition sphere, the transportation sphere and the munitions sphere. SPEER had the power only to allocate the workers already allocated to him from SAUCKEL without any influence whatsoever as to the composition of this labor force (Woman, foreign workers etc.).

H0805-0079

Mr. BURDELL:

Question: You said that the SPEER Ministry had nothing to do with the procurement of these workers or the composition of same, or the type of work that they would do, that they were obtained by SAUCKEL. It is true, is it not, that the SPEER Ministry knew quite well that SAUCKEL was getting a great portion of his workers from abroad and the occupied territories?

Answer: Yes, I knew that.

Question: As a matter of fact, SPEER had representatives in the occupied territories whose function was among other things to act as a liaison with SAUCKEL or to represent SPEER's Ministry in SAUCKEL' offices in the occupied territories.

Answer: I did not know that SPEER had representatives in the occupied territory.

Mr. BURDELL:

Question: You said that SPEER had some objection to the use of foreign workers and actually he wanted to use German workers because the problem of feeding foreign workers was so great. Is that correct?

Answer: Mr. SPEER was in principle opposed to the use of foreign workers, because he was of the opinion that Germany had sufficient German workers to cover the needs, especially if it could be possible to transfer into the occupied territories a set-up for the production of consumer civilian needs.

Question: Actually, was there some heavy work in Germany, such as coal mining and steel production for which there was no German labor available?

Answer: It would have been possible to transfer a considerable amount of German workers from other industries into these heavy industries.

H0805-0080

Question: Women did not do this work, could they?

Answer: They could be used in the steel industrie. The argument was raised that in the first World War 16% of the employees were composed of women and in this war there were 5% and then only 7% women employees.

Question: Is it not actually true that the draft conscription created a terrific shortage insofar as German workers were concerned, particularly in the heavy industries?

Answer: There was no question that the draft conscription did have an effect on the over-all production, because the substitute staffs had to be taught.

Question: Was it not true that there was a considerable shortage of specialists or skilled workers in Germany?

Answer: For a long time we were opposed to the induction of these skilled workers - at the beginning successfully, but especially in the last years of the war, we could no longer oppose the conscription of these skilled workers.

Question: Actually did not the SPEER Ministry ask for specialists and skilled workers from abroad?

Answer: I can give no direct information on this point as I did not work directly in the Ministry.

Question: For all you know, the SPEER Ministry may in some cases have actually asked for foreign workers?

Answer: I cannot answer that question.

Question: In other words, you don't know if the Ministry in some cases asked for foreign workers?

Answer: In general, it did not, but I could not testify as to what might have happened in the case of specialists.

H0805-0081

Question: You did not make the requests to SAUCKEL yourself, did you?

Answer: No - never.

Question: You were never present when SCHMELTER made the request, were you?

Answer: No.

Question: Actually you have no direct knowledge of what went on between SCHMELTER and SAUCKEL?

Answer: No.

Question: As a matter of fact, you heard SPEER himself, at a meeting in October, 1943, say that the use of foreign workers would and must remain emergency measure?

Answer: As a final emergency, yes, I heard that.

Question: Actually it was not SPEER's view that if and when foreign workers were necessary, it was all right to bring them in?

Answer: I must assume so.

Dr. FLAECHSNER:

The defense objects to the question because it is only the personal opinion of the witness. The witness was asked his opinion about SPEER's opinion.

Mr. BURDELL:

Question: What was the function of these Bedarfspruefungskommissionen?

Answer: The task of these commissions was to control the demands made by the enterprises as to whether they actually were necessary, as these demands had been doubted by the political agencies, so this committee actually found out if the requirements set forth were correct and the labor office had to fulfill these demands insofar as the manpower existed.

H0805-0082

Question: What was the sense of this entire commission?

Answer: To control the requirements of the demand. This control was done before the allocation was effected by Berlin.

Question: What was the purpose of that committee for; even before SPEER made his demands, they were fulfilled if the necessary manpower was there. What was the reason for it?

Answer: The purpose was that they doubted these requirements and wanted to control them.

Question: Who composed that committee? You say it was a political agency which wanted to control them?

Answer: Next to the representatives of the Armament Inspector and the Labor Office, there were representatives of the Gauleiters.

Question: Who had the deciding vote in that Committee? Who was the President?

Answer: I cannot say, but I think the representative of the Labor Office.

Certified true excerpt

s/Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER

t/Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER
Attorney at Law

H0805-0083

SPEER Document
No. 57

Speer Exhibit No .....

Excerpt from
Testimony of witness Annemarie KEMPF, taken on behalf of the Defendant SPEER, by Dr. Hans Flaechsner at Kransberg, Germany on 3 April 1946.
Interpreter: Mr. Wolfgang Thormann

Cross-Examination: Mr. Charles S. Burdell, OUSCC.

Witness and interpreter duly sworn in.

Dr. Flarchsner:

Question 1.) What was your position in the Ministry of Speer ?

Answer 1.) Since he became General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital - the spring of 1937 - I have been his personal secretary, and when he became Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition in Febr. 1942, I was taken into the new ministry in the same capacity.

Question 3.) From when to when was Speer sick and to what extent was he incapacitated to fulfil his duty during this time ?

Answer 3.) He was sick from the middle of January to about the middle of May 1944. While it was impossible in the beginning to give brief summaries about official matters by his closest assistants, his condition became so much worse in the beginning of February that upon the doctor's orders all visits had to be stopped. In the middle of March it became possible to transport him from Hohenlynchen to Meran. The recuperation also proceeded here very slowly. The attempt to restore official communication with Berlin for current matters failed because it was impossible to take up regular activity on account of constant relapses.

Mr. Speer returned to Berlin about the middle of May 1944.

H0805-0084

Question 4.) Did he participate in

a) the meeting of the central planning board of February 1944

b) " " " " " " " " March 1944

c) Hitler's conference of March 1944

d) Hitler's conference of 7 April 1944 ?

Answer 4.) No, Mr. Speer did not participate in any of these meetings.

Question 5.) Was the text of the transcripts of the two meetings of the central planning board shown to him during or after his illness ?

Answer 5.) Certainly not during his illness. As far as I can remember, Speer did not read them after his return.

Question 6.) Was Speer against construction of 6 fighter plane plants for which orders were given to Dorsch by Hitler in the middle of April ? Did Speer, through his assistant Fraenk, offer to resign and do you remember the contents of the telephone conversation with Goering ?

Answer 6.) During the different conversations at which I was present, Speer spoke to his assistants and partly to me with unequivocal severity against carrying out this order. Several telephone calls took place in this matter, among others with Below as intermediary between Speer and Hitler. When he did not succeed in cancelling this order, one of his old assistants, Dr. Fraenk was finally charged to take Speer's offer to resign to Obersalzberg.

Question 7.) Did Himmler send a notice according to which Speer was admitted to the SS as an SS man, or that he belongs to his personal staff and why did you have to know about that ?

Answer 7.) No, such a notice was not sent. As personal secretary, I had knowledge of all private and personal matters, and took care of them myself. Already during his work as an architect, the attempt was made to admit Speer with an honorary rank. Mr. Speer declined to become a member of the SS or to accept an honorary rank.

Question 8.) Was Speer a member of the SA or NSKK and at what rank ?

Answer 8.) The NSKK listed him as simple NSKK man. He also declined here to accept an honorary rank.

Question 9.) By whom and where was Speer invited to a conference a few days before 20 July, and why did Speer not accept this invitation ?

Answer 9.) On 17 or 18 July, Mr. Speer was invited by the Chief of Staff General Fromm, Colonel Kennes, to an urgent personal meeting with Fromm on 20 July at 14.00 if I remember right. Through the events of 20 July and after publication of the projected list of ministers with Mr. Speer on it, the significance of this invitation became only subsequently known to us.

Question 10) What measures of Speer are known to you to secure the possibility of life for the people, and what was the personal attitude of Speer in this matter ?

Answer 10) Mr. Speer was against the measures of destruction. From reports which he dictated to me, I did know that according to his opinion a successful military conclusion of the war since the middle of 10 was impossible, and that the effect of this destruction had to hit first of all the German people.

As chief Secretary in the office of the ministry I had the opportunity to follow from the beginning this measure till it reached the climax of open rebellion against the orders of the Fuehrer regarding the question of paralysis and destruction. I was acquainted with important documents for Mr. Speer as well as his written orders which especially in this connection were mostly dictated to me personnally. Also, memoranda written at the end of his travels by his liaison officer, First Lieutenant von Poser, about the instructions issued on these trips and the contents of the talks given by him, became familiar to me, as far as they did not serve anyway as basis for his own dictated travle reports.

H0805-0085

H0805-0086

During this time there were often talks between Mr. Speer and me about his intentions and the measures considered necessary by him, especially since I was also familiar with the contrary instruction of the Fuehrer. The events of this time of convulsion left a deep impression with me.

As early as August 1944, Mr. Speer had issued a directive for the Balkans to the OT that, if threatened by the enemy, the mines operated by them were not to be destroyed, for the reason that their use would be of decisive importance to the enemy, who had sufficiently large supplies. - The same directive had been issued for the industrial installations of France.

After Mr. Speer's report, the Fuehrer at first made the decision in accordance with his idea - not to carry out any destruction, if necessary to cripple them.

Corresponding orders were given to Plaiger by Mr. Speer for Luxenbourg, the Saar-territory, etc. and also for the coal-mining territories of Belgium and Holland.

In September 1944 - after the danger arose that Germany might become a battle-field - in spite of the existing decision by the Fuehrer, the order was issued that, in all areas which had to be relinquished to the enemy, mines and industrial installations, etc. were to be destroyed.

Mr. Speer at first tried again to have the orders, already issued altered, or rather, he himself issued appropriate directives to all authorities under his jurisdiction not to carry out any destruction under any circumstances.

As the Fuehrer firmly believed that the lost territories could be regained, Mr. Speer once more succeeded in obtaining the consent of the Fuehrer for changing the directives from destruction to crippling by stressing the pointlessness of regaining these territories if even we could not use them any more owing to the destruction. It was brought about that this decision was transmitted in a teletype, drafted by Speer via Bormann to all Gauleiters in the West directly afterwards to the threatened Gaus in the East and also as a precaution to the Southern Gaus, Holland and the Northern Gaus.

H0805-0087

Nevertheless, the OKW again demanded the destruction instead of the crippling of the mines, when in December, the Saar-territory was threatened. Mr. Speer , without asking the Fuehrer, immediately issued a new order, in form of a Fuehrer decision, forbidding the destruction and received his consent, afterwards.

At the same time, Mr. Speer made the offer to State Secretary Riecke or Reich Minister Backe from the Ministry of Food, to place the guarantee of the food supplies before the armament tasks and issued corresponding directives for supplying power and coal.

When Mr. Speer took over the direction of the newly founded staff for traffic in February, one of the first measures he took was fixing the priority of goods to be transported and he placed food supplies first, far ahead of armament supplies. Again corresponding directives were issued to all authorities concerning the priority of food supplies, over anything else, including armaments. Mr. Speer issued the order to the OT that food-producing concerns, damaged by air-attacks were to be repaired first.

Malzacher, when he was made Plenipotentiary for Armaments was also told by him to act in all the territories placed under his jurisdiction (Bohemia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Upper Silesia) according to his general directions. During this trip, it was also decided in Army Group South, that the Hungarian mineral oil areaswere only to be crippled. At Army Group Schoerner, he had, on a previous trip, already obtained the promise that the Blechhammer and Heydebreck hydrogenation plants should be maintained

At the end of February, Mr. Speer again went into the Ruhr territory and there determined in detail the security measures which were to be taken.

As Mr. Speers power of influence with regard to saving bridges was negligible, he drew up a corresponding draft of a decree to which Guderian consented; Field Marshl Keitel, however, did not sign it without the consent of the Fuehrer, Guderian spoke in favor of it t the Fuehrer; the decree however, was rejected.

Mr. Speer, with an unequivocal report to the Fuehrer on 15 March, concerning the situation again tried to bring about general measure for the maintenance of the people's means of existance.

H0805-0088

In this connection he made various suggestions for decrees to spare railroad and bridge installations and to forbid the desturction of industrial plants.

As Mr. Speer told us on the same evening, the Fuehrer took the report and replied he would answer him in this case in writing. Mr. Speer was under the impression that the Fuehrer knew about the contents which he talked about to a rather large circle.

During the same night, Mr. Speer went to the West in order to influence the Gauleiters there not to execute the order, issued in the meantime, to exacuate the population from the areas threatened by the enemy. At the instigation of Mr. Speer, a trip in the West had been made shortly before by Dr. Hupfauer with the knowledge of the Ministry of Food and the Party Chancellery, during which the unanimous decision was reached with the Gauleiters concerned, that an evacuation of these areas could and must under no circumstances be carried through. Against this, the total evacuation was decreed by order of the Fuehrer.

On this trip, the Fuehrer's order for total destruction, dated 19 March, was made while the conference with Kesselring was still being held. This probably was the answer to the opposing demands of Mr. Speer, Mr. Speer immediately stopped his trip - he postponed proceeding to the Ruhr.

Through this Fuehrer order dated 19 March, all previous orders were cancelled, including those of Mr. Speer. The responsibility for all measures to be taken was transferred to the Gauleiters. It was then that Mr. Speer with all means and the most varied reasons necessary at the time, tried to prevent the destruction ordered, because he saw in its execution the destruction of the basis of existence of the German people, this probably being the idea of order.

Malzacher was immediately ordered to Berlin and he promised at the time to take all measures in every case to prevent any destruction. Mr. Speer himself again went to the West and into the Ruhr territory to discuss further measures on the spot with Rohland, Kelohner, Roechling, etc.

H0805-0089

H0805-0090

In conference with Model and Kesselring, he tried to bring these also to his way of thinking. State Secretary Schultze - Fielitz, who accompanied him on this trip, was sent on, after it had started out, to the South, the Tyrol and Vorarlberg in order to assure that the big power plants were saved - if necessary by force.

The OT had already been instructed to remove all explosive supplies which were possibly stored on the sites in order to save them before they were seized by other officials.

Speer, by exerting his influence on the executive regulations, attempted to nullify the orders for destruction, which had been issued in the meantime by the Chief of communications and Chief of transportation section of the Wehrmacht and called for increasingly thorough destruction.

Upon his return from the Ruhr territory, Speer was ordered to a conference with the Fuehrer. Recounting the Conference, he spoke more or less as follows: Hitler reproached him in that, according to reports from various Gauleiters and from Bormann, he no longer believed in a favorable outcome of the war and was sabotaging his directives. He should know that he had everyone guilty of this condemned to death. He would have done this to him also, had he not been his artist. Speer replied that he was fully aware of this fact in acting thus and asked that norconsideration be taken for his person.

He was ready to take the consequence. The war was lost. He would not like to be one of those who thought the same way but did not have the courage to say so. The Fuehrer wished to send him on leave he was overworked. Speer declined this decision. In that situation he could not allow himself to be deprived of the opportunity of taking respondibility for what might then be done by others in his name. The Fuehrer,"for reasons of domestic and foreign policy" could not decide on dismissing him from his office. The Fuehrer attempted to change Speer's opinion and requested his decision by the following day.

Speer wanted to present him with his reasons for his attitude and demands in writing.

He wrote the answer of 29 March which I have copied by hand. On returning from this renewed conversation, Speer said that the Fuehrer refused to accept the written answer. He had,however, been able, after again stating his actual reasons, to bring the Fuehrer around to a new order from Speer's draft, which was to be signed on 30 March and presented the possibility of counteracting the plans for destruction. Speer's executive instructions, which this order again authorized him to carry out, were no longer submitted to the Fuehrer. There could be no doubt about their interpretation. The decree with instructions for execution was forwarded to all authorities by every method - wireless, teletype, courier etc. In order to help the Ruhr territory Speer agreed to a meeting with Seyss-Inquart during the Easter holidays, which Dr.Hupfauer attended. Speer proposed to get in touch with the British headquarters to negotiate for an exchange of coal - for Holland - for potatoes - for the Ruhr. Seyss-Inquart was in favor of making that attempt. At the same time discussions on a new order with Gauleiter Wagner.

In order to preserve bridges and railroads, Speer, from 5 April onwards, issued individual instructions for various stretches of railroad to his own authorities and those of the Ministry of Transportation with the text of an OKW-order,-composed by himself and signed by General Winter. The text of this order, as one already signed and sent out was forwarded to General Winter himself in the form of a proposed draft. In it, our authorities were instructed by virtue of this teletype message to inform immediately the military authorities of it.

H0805-0091

Up to the time of the capitulation, Speer unceasingly endeavoured to oppose the plans for total destruction. Starting from Berlin he went from one General to another, in Berlin itself he prevented the already prepared blowing up of all even the almost smallest bridges. He ensured the preservation of the power-installations at Finkenherd near Berlin, he managed to get the promise that the preservation of the Niederfinow wet dock installations would be ensured. It was possible to restrict the bridge-blowing across the Elbe. At his request General Thomale placed reliable officers at his disposal in order to prevent destructions even in Southern Germany, if necessary, by force.

H0805-0092

H0805-0093

A major was sent with a personal note to Seebauer and then to Malzacher to assist them,if necessary. In the middle of April Speer prepared a radio-speech which was to be published as soon as the battle for Berlin ended and it was to be feared the fight would continue to the last man. This speech was recorded in the broadcastin house in Hamburg and contained corresponding instructions. By the appointment of Grand Admiral Doenitz as Hitler's successor, it was possible to assume the measures demanded in them as legal orders, all destruction and crippling to be finally stopped, even in the areas still occupied, Wehrwolf activity etc. which was to be feared was to be stopped. Since the fall of 1944 Speer issued instruction ordered counter-orders and directives,one after the other, undertook trips, made speeches, day and night, in all with the thought of preserving the means of the people's existence after the lost wa The greater part of his colleagues were prepared to undertake the duties he set them even to the point of risking their lives. Speer himself never shrank from openly raising his demands. We feared more than once that his reports to the Fuehrer or his remarks to th widest of circles must lead to his arrest. But this made no impression on him -- he considered it his duty to act thusly.

Mr. Burdell:

Question: About these minutes of the Central Planning Board for these meeting which Speer did not attend ? Were the minutes sent to his office ?

Answer: No. Mr. Speer was not in office. They were not sent to Meran. The orders were to save all this material and submit it to him upon his return. However, it accumlated so that it was not possible for him to see all these minutes.

H0805-0094

Question: They were however sent from the Central Planning Board to his office ?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Can you say positively that he did not read them ?

Answer: That would have been just a coincidence.

Question: I would like to have an answer to the question. Can you state positively that he did not read them ?

Answer: No.

Question: Did someone from the Speer Ministry attend these two meetings ?

Answer: Field Marshal Milch.

Question: What about Mr. Schieber ?

Answer: I cannot say because at that time I was in Meran.

Question: What about Schmelter and Saur ?

Answer: That is the same thing, I was not in Berlin I cannot say.

Question: Do you know, whether or not after Minister Speer's recovery he discussed with Field-Marshal Milch the matters which took place at these two meetings ?

Answer: After Minister Speer's sickness he was informed of the most important happenings by his various officials, but I cannot say anything in detail.

Question: After his sickness then, he had discussions with Milch ? Is that correct ?

Answer: Yes.

Question: You worked for Minister Speer for about 8 years?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Towards the end he took you into his confidence about many of his ideas and plans, is that right ?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Did he ever talk to you about the use of foreign labor in German war plants ?

Answer: No.

Question: Did he ever express any objections to you about the use of foreign workers in German war plants ?

Answer: No. I have not talked to him about this either.

Question: His objections to the orders of Hitler and other representatives of the Government were limited principally to these destruction orders of September 1944, is that correct ?

Answer: There were many orders that came after that which were much stronger.

Question: But you are quite sure that he did not express any objection to you concerning the use of foreign labor ?

Answer: We have never talked about it.

Dr. Flaechsner:

Question: Has Minister Speer talked to you about the differences with Sauckel

Answer: Differences with Sauckel arose often and we got to see all the various documents of both sides, but there was never any specific conversation with me about any of it.

That is all.

Certified true correct
s/ Dr. Hans Flaechsner
t/ Dr. Hans Flaechsner
Attorney-at-Law

H0805-0095

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SPEER Document No. 58 SPEER Exhibit No. . . . .

Testimony of HEINZ GUDERIAN, taken at Hersbruck, Germany, 10 May 1946, 1530 to 1630, by Dr. Hand FLAECHSNER, and Mr. Charles S. BURDELL, Interrogator. Also present: Mr. Jan P. CHARMATZ, Interpreter, and Mr. Charles J. GALLAGHER, Court reporter.

QUESTION BY DR. FLAECHSNER TO THE INTERPRETER:

Q Do you solemnly swear that you will truly and faithfully translate my questions from English to German, and the responses of the witness fro. German into English to the best of your ability, so help youGod? Interpreter

A I do.

QUESTION BY DR. FLAECHSNER TO THE WITNESS:

Q Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Witness

A I do.

Dr. FLAECHSNER

Question 1. What was the talk you had with SPEER in March 1945, which mostly concerned the destruction of bridges?

MR BURDELL: I object to the inclusion of the answer to this question in evidence on the grounds it does not tend to prove or disprove any issues in the case, and, therefore, is irrelevant and immaterial. I would like this objection to run to this entire line of questioning concerning the destruction of bridges.

Minister SPEER

Answer 1. In March 1945/approached me and asked me to obtain an order from the Fuehrer in order to avoid senseless destruction of bridges. I agreed entirely with SPEER's opinion that only such bridges could be, or should be destroyed which were necessary for the defense of the main lines of resistance. In particular we wanted to avoid such destruction of those lines which were necessary for the life of the civilian populati

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We were concerned mostly with communications, bridges, utility plants, as concerned electricity and gas works, slaughter houses, and other institutions which were necessary for the life of the civilian population. I made a draft for an order of the Fuehrer which we talked over with SPEER.

Question 2. Who prevented the subsequent order on sparing the bridges and buildings arrived at by you and SPEER, and how?

Answer 2. These measures concerned all theatres of operation, so this order had to be issued as a Wehrmacht order, that means for all parts of the armed forces. Therefore, I handed over the draft to the Col. Gen. JODL, and asked him to report to the Fuehrer in the sense of my own and SPEER's opinion being expressed. The next day I asked JODL what the Fuehrer had decided, and he let me read an order which was to the contrary of what SPEER and I myself had wanted, because the Fuehrer did not believe that the Generals would execute an order, as he had issued it. This order was issued to the Gauleiters, and the Gauleiters were free to execute these destructions. What had been talked about in detail when JODL reported to the Fuehrer, I don't know.

Question 3. I see you actually replied to my third question reading, that a few days later HITLER signed in this situation his decree for destruction. What were his reasons for this decree? What can you add to that?

Answer 3. I may add that a few days after this discussion about the draft, HITLER in the most vehement words asked for a destruction of all buildings, so that nothing would be taken by the enemy undestroyed.

Question 4. And this again refers to all theatres of operation?

Answer 4. Yes, to all theatres of operation.

Question 5. If I understand you correctly, this referred to all theatres of operation, such as Norway, Italy, Holland, etc.?

Answer 5. No, this referred only to Germany. No fights were going on in Norway. Italy was included as well as the Balkans and Holland. According to my opinion no fighting was going on in Norway, therefore, nothing was to be destroyed.

Question 6. I want to ask some supplementary questions. Mr. Witness, when did you declare to RIBBENTROP that the war was one-hundred per cent lost, and how did HITLER re-act?

MR BURDELL: I object on the grounds that the answer would be immaterial.

Answer 6. THE WITNESS: After the Russian break-through to the Reich or German Eastern front, which took place in the days from the 12th to the 14th of January, the German situation was so bad that for the lack of reserves th defense in the east would be impossible, if the hostilities with ourr western opponents would not be stopped immediately. The reserves which we had for the east had in November been transferred to the west to be used for the defensive in the Ardennes. When at Christmas the failure of the Ardennes defensive was obvious, I asked for their return, and this HITLER declined to do so. Therefore, from a military point of view, there was no possibility to stop the Russian offensive, and it was the end of January when I saw RIBBENTROP, and described to him this situation. I asked him to take immediate diplomatic measures to end either the war in the west, or in the east, and, if possible at all, to end the war entirely RIBBENTROP declined to take any steps with the Fuehrer. I remained upon my demands, and asked him what he as a foreign minister would do if in four weeks the Russians were to be in Berlin. He asked me very surprised if I thought this to be possible at all.

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I only answered him that I thought this would happen for sure in four to six weeks. Nevertheless, RIBBENTROP did not change his attitude, declining to report my request to the Fuehrer. A few days later when the military report was given to the Fuehrer, he explained, "If the Chief of the General Staff informs the foreign minister about a military situation, he commits treason." From this declaration I had to gather that HITLER had found out about the step I had taken with RIBBENTROP. Afterwards when I was in prison I learned that RIBBENTROP had sent a note about that to the Fuehrer without mentioning any names.

Question 7. May I ask you a question which is not so essential. Were you informed in detail about the situation of the armament production by SPEER, and how it was decided?

Answer 7. Yes, I was informed by SPEER in detail, and we had frequent and close contact with each other.

Question 8. Did SPEER predict a break down of the armament production in two or three months?

Answer 8. Yes, SPEER informed me in detail about the armaments production, and showed me his memoranda concerning these questions before he showed them to the Fuehrer.

Question 9. Did HITLER according to your opinion continue to wage the war in order to make transition from war to peace easier for the people?

Answer 9. It is very hard to answer this question. This is very hard to answer, but I was under the impression that HITLER in these drab months identified his own person with the German people. His stubbornness, and his ambitions made it impossible for him to declare that this war was lost. I would like to add that SPEER in his memoranda in the Winter of 1944-1945, used the following sentence several times: "The war is lost." HITLER therefore, could have no doubt that SPEER had a clear idea about the state of our armaments. But I myself was a witness that SPEER could not obtain an urgent audience in order to turn over a memoranda.

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HITLER said, "He wants to tell me something disagreeable, only I do not want to hear it. He should come back after three days." SPEER and I agreed in January 1945 that the war was lost.

Question 10. In March 1945 when you had this discussion with SPEER, all the fighting was practically only in Germany?

Answer 10. Yes, with the exception of Italy.

CROSS EXAMINATION

QUESTIONS BY MR. BURDELL:

Q This conversation you had with SPEER about the destruction of the bridges was in March 1945, or afterwards, is that correct?

A In March 1945; the 16th or 18th of March.

Q And that was after you thought the war was already lost, is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And SPEER thought the war was lost at that time, did he not?

A SPEER and I consented in January 1945 that the war was lost.

Q And at the time you had this conversation with SPEER in March 1945, at that time practically all of the fighting was taking place in Germany, is that true?

A Yes.

MR BURDELL: I think that is all.

Certified true copy.

Signed: Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER

Typed : Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER
Attorney at Law

SPEER Doc.
No. 59

(Page 181 of orig.)
SPEER Exhibit No.

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Excerpt from:

Testimony of Witness DIETRICH STAHL, taken on behalf of the Defendant SPEER, by Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER at Darmstadt, Germany, on 3 April, 1946.
Cross-Examination: Mr. Charles S. BURDELL, CUSCC.
Interpreter: Mr. Wolfgang THORMANN

Dr. FLAECHSNER: Mr. THORMANN, do you state on your oath that you will accurately and faithfully interpret, from German into English, the questions about to be propounded to this witness and the answers given thereto?

Mr. THORMANN : I do.

Dr. FLAECHSNER: (To witness): Do you solemnly swear that the statements you are about to make shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

WITNESS : I do.

1. Question: What honorary office have you held in SPEER's Ministry?

1. Answer : I am an independent manufacturer and beginning 11 August 1944 I held the honorary post of Chief of the Munition-Committee (Hauptausschuss-Munition). From 10 January 1945 on, I served as liaison between SPEER and the other departmental chiefs of the technical office. A short recount as to how I came to hold this honorary position seems essential, since it would throw a full light upon the situation and SPEER's attitude at that time. I had already in May 1944, without my agreement during a longer spell of SPEER's illness, been appointed by the chief of the technical office to take over the position of commissary chief of the main department in place of the likewise ill current chief. I now proceeded to attain an interview with SPEER, who had, up to that time, been not very well known to me, in order to obtain my dismissal. This interview was delayed until beginning of August by the confusion that came about through the events of the 20 July. In this interview with SPEER I frankly stated, that I had no desire for the position forced upon me, since the duties in my own enterprise necessitated my being there and that anyway I was not sufficiently schooled and professionally not suited for the task, that furthermore I had no backing by the Party but only the greatest difficulties with the Party.

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To my greatest amazement all these arguments had not a negative but a positive effect on SPEER. Encouraged by this fact I told him, that to my opinion the most important thing to do was to end the war speedily and not to prolong it foolishly. I am of the same opinion replied SPEER and gave me a full glance into the situation of that time. He told me that he himself was treated with the greatest of suspicion, after his name had appeared on the new list of Ministers of 20 July and that he stood in danger of being removed from his office in order to open the doors of industry to radical elements of the party. Nothing would have been easier for him, as not to return from his sick-leave but he had returned to his office, prompted by an inner sense of duty, to ward off the worst and to build a dam in industry, to prevent from taking effect this insane idea of total destruction of all industrial and supply installations and sacrifice to the last man. To my surprise, here I found for the first time a leading and responsible man who judged the actual situation clearly and soberly and had not only the courage to hold such conversations which were considered as deadly dangerous but was also willing to act decisively.

2. Question: Can you tell us, what SPEER demanded of you in the middle of February 1945 and for what purposes and reasons?

2. Answer : It was in the middle of February 1945, I cannot recall the exact day, when I was ordered to see SPEER in a matter of information about expected output of munitions. After all conclusion of the strictly official business SPEER gave me details about his struggle against

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the senseless measures taken for destruction, the defense of strategically absolutely unimportant towns and villages, the Volkssturm and so on, and expressed his deep regret, that nothing sensible and serious was undertaken to end this already lost war. SPEER further pointed out, that he thought, BORMANN, HIMMLER and GOEBBELS were the most radical and dangerous in HITLER's entourage. In the course of this rather long conversation, SPEER, innermost visibly agitated said about the following:

I can no longer bear it and witness it, that we are governed by insane leaders. Our people will be completely annihilated, if nothing decisive is done to counteract these crazy plans for destruction. I have come to realize that it is necessary, to put an end to these acts, if need be by force. But it serves no purpose to get rid of a single man, but rather the most dangerous entire inner circle must go. Mr. SPEER then informed me of the plan he had thought out. He intended to throw poison-gas grenades into the openings of the air-raid shelter at the Reich-Chancery and asked me how such a gas-grenade worked and what effect it had.

I could not tell him, because I neither knew what gases there were nor their effect or how to use them. Very much impressed by the whole description, I promised to enquire surreptitiously for details from my liaison officer in the Munitions-group of the Office for Army-weapons and to let him know the result of my enquiries.

I applied to Lieutenant-Colonel Dipl. Ing. SOIKA for information about the existing poison gases and poison-gas-grenades. He however, could also give me no definite information, because he was equally not well enough informed. The whole subject of war gases was kept very strictly secret. But SOIKA enquired about the matter and explained to me

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a few days later, that the solid war gas was broken into very small pieces only, when the grenade exploded and did not evaporate and cause a fog as liquid war gases do.
I passed this information on to Mr. SPEER in detail and told him that, in my opinion, his plan, for technical reasons, could not be carried out or be effective.
I believe it was during the latter half of March, after HITLER's last official order of destruction, that I was again called to SPEER. He told me that he had now thought out another plan. HIMMLER, GOEBBELS and BORMANN, the three most dangerous and pernicious, met nearly every evening in the Reich-Chancery to work out their diabolical plans, to pronounce the terrible death sentences etc.. During the night air-raids, all three left the Reich-Chancery in their cars to the suburbs of Berlin and a moment like this was to be made use of for a surprise attack. He had found several courageous men who were good shots and he himself would deal with one of the three cars.
Mr. SPEER gave me the task of getting him submachine-guns, pistols (I believe 12 of them) and the ammunition for them. He also asked for some flare cartridges for illumination, similar to those dropped by airplanes as marking signals. This was an exciting and turbulent time; nobody was sure of his life any more and also Mr. SPEER carried from that time on a loaded pistol. - I myself had just with the help of SPEER managed to escape a Gestapo-investigation, on account of defeatist remarks.
In April 1945, I made another personal delivery to SPEER of automatic pistols, pistols and a great amount of ammuniton.

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Mr. BURDELL:

Question: You say that this conversation with Minister SPEER took place some time about the middle of February 1945? Prior to that time had SPEER made any mention to you of his plans or intentions in this connection?

Answer : I answered that in the first question. I did not know Minister SPEER before August 1944.

Question: Between Augsut 1944 and February 1945 did you get to know Minister SPEER quite well?

Answer : Yes. I had to take over the main committee for munitions. And after SPEER came back I wanted to ask SPEER to relieve me of my duties. I did this for three reasons. First of all I had no ties with the NSDAP. Secondly, because I always had trouble with the Party, and third, because I was of the opinion that the war should be brought to an end. Instead of being relieved, Minister SPEER said to me that I was just the man they wanted and thus my acquaintance with SPEER came about. I was liaison man between SPEER and the various other heads of the committees in order to prevent the destruction order of 15 September 1944.

Question: In view of the fact that you only got to know SPEER in 1944, how does it happen that as soon as February 1945 SPEER felt that it was safe to take up such a delicate matter with you?

Answer : I can't say off hand just how. After all, when I was liaison man SPEER had already represented a certain amount of trust in me.

Certified true copy

s/ Dr. HANS FLAECHSNER

t/ Dr. HANS FLAECHSNER

Attorney-at-law

SPEER Document No. 60
SPEER Exhibit No. .....

Excerpt from

Interrogation of Karl BRANDT, Dachau, 28 May, 1946.

Question 2: Did SPEER tell you that the danger of the employment of war gas existed and when was that ?

Answer 2: The question of employment of war gas was discussed several times by SPEER with me.

Question 3: What was SPEER's opinion on this ?

Answer 3: SPEER was of the opinion that in any case a war with war gas started from the German part should be provented. It was evident for us that, if from any part of the German war leadership an order would come for employing of war gas, the practical use of it should be in any case out. There were conferences on that subject with SPEER in that exact form positively in autumn 1944 ... and also later in spring 1945.

Question 5: What was BORMANN's official and personal relationship with SPEER

Answer 5: The official and personal relations between Martin BORMANN and SPEER were getting worse during the years. It was in the years 1944 till 1945 exactly so that Martin BORMANN rejected SPEER in particular in his official position. As I did not talk any more to M. BORMANN practically since 1943, I have not learned this fr M. BORMANN himself but I noticed it as an observer and also from the general directives we were getting from Fuehrer Headquarters.

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SPEER himself opposed M. BORMANN strongly and endangered himself in that way very much. The differences caused high tensions which made the work of SPEER very difficult, because in conformity with M. BORMANN also a large number of the Gauleiters opposed SPEER personally, but at least his work. In general SPEER who came late to the Party was declined mentally by the men of the Party.

signed Karl BRANDT

Dachau, 28 May 1946

Subscribed and sworn to before me on 28 May, 1946

William C. CLARK 1st Lt.Inf.

Interpreter: Dr. BORTHEIMER

Certified true copy

s/ Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER

t/ Dr. Hans FLAECHSNER

Attorney-at-law

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19 June 1946

We, E. M. WITT, Civ., 344289, and MARTIN L. LOWENTHAL, Civ., D 150848, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document.

E. M. WITT
Civ., 344289

MARTIN L. LOWENTHAL
Civ., D 150848